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1.1 The Delayed Fertility Transition
Many who are concerned about rapid population growth in developing
countries have hoped and expected that economic development would
be an effective contraceptive. If it is, then population policy can confine
itself to the libertarian stance of subsidizing family-planning propaganda
and contraceptive means. While experience has shown that family-plan-
ning programs achieve only very modest fertility reductions when large
families are desired, the task of reducing desired family size might be left
to policies aimed at economic development. By fostering education,
industrialization, income growth, and female employment outside the
home, general development policies may be a prompt and efficient way
to cut fertility. But if economic development fails to bring prompt and
sustained fertility reductions, developing countries will have more rea-
son to consider tougher antinatal measures, such as Singapore's stiff
birth disincentives of 1972-73 or, beyond them, compulsory steriliza-
tion. The social costs of these measures would have to be weighed
against the perceived social-insurance benefits of faster fertility reduction
as a means of lessening congestion and income inequality.
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There is a consensus that economic development ultimately prevents
births, both by improving the supply of contraceptive means and by
raising the perceived costliness of extra children. Ignoring George Stig-
ler's lemma that "there are not ten good reasons for anything," we rattle
off long lists of well-known reasons why economic development makes
children seem more costly and less of an economic asset.! Economic
development pulls women out of the home, giving them a greater sense
of control over their lives, greater access to contraceptive information,
and a heightened sense of the earnings they stand to lose by having
children. Economic development pulls older children out of jobs and
into school, thus cutting their direct economic contribution to their
parents' households. It also raises couples' awareness that social mobil-
ity depends on per capita family expenditures that would be dragged
down by the arrival of extra children. Their "consumer aspirations" are
raised, both by income growth itself and by greater exposure to new
luxury goods. This exposure is fostered by the migration from farm to
city, by industrialization, and by education. Children become less valu-
able as insurance of old-age support as the development of asset mar-
kets and social security gives parents cheaper ways to assure themselves
that support. Greater geographic mobility replaces the extended family
with the nuclear family, raising the cost and difficulty of arranging for
supplementary child care. Meanwhile, reductions in infant and child
mortality cut the number of births necessary to achieve any desired num-
ber of surviving children.
The individual arguments linking fertility decline to economic devel-
opment through child costs are not always well spelled out, or docu-
mented, or logically aligned with each other-a shortcoming that will
be partly remedied here. But they are at least well agreed upon. Indeed,
"economic" as these links may sound to some, their importance in ex-
plaining the secular fertility decline is not a subject that divides the
disciplines.
Much less resolved is the explanation of the earlier part of the fertility
transition that most directly worries antinatal scholars and policy-makers
in developing countries today. The secular fertility decline often begins
rather late in the "development" or "modernization" process. Just how
late depends on how one defines development and modernization.
If the onset of development is signaled by a sustained drop in mor-
tality, then the lag of the fertility decline behind the start of development
is often long and highly variable. Figure 1.1 and table 1.1 remind us of
this by returning to the varied chronologies of crude birthrates and death
rates, the most available proxies for fertility and mortality rates across
wide stretches of time and space.
Among the early-developing countries, some had no lag between the





































































































































































































































































































Year or rate/ rate/
Country period 1,000 1,000 Source
England/ 1731-70 37 32 Brownlee, via Kuznets 1966, table 2.3
Wales 1781-1820 37 25 Brownlee, via Kuznets 1966, table 2.3
1841-50 32.6a 22.4 Postan and Habakkuk 1965, table 9
1851-60 34.1a 22.2 Postan and Habakkuk 1965, table 9
1861-76 35.2a 22.5 Postan and Habakkuk 1965, table 9
1876-80 35.3 20.8 Postan and Habakkuk 1965, table 9
1886-90 31.4 18.9 Postan and Habakkuk 1965, table 9
1896-1900 29.3 17.7 Postan and Habakkuk 1965, table 9
1906-10 26.3 14.7 Postan and Habakkuk 1965, table 9
1926-30 16.7 12.1 Postan and Habakkuk 1965, table 9
1936---40 14.7 12.5 Postan and Habakkuk 1965, table 9
1951-55 15.2 11.7 Postan and Habakkuk 1965, table 9
UK 1973 13 12 UN, via Population Reference
Bureau 1976
USA 1790-1800 55 25 Grabill et a!., via Kuznets 1966,
table 2.3
1870-75 40.8 21.8 Easterlin 1968, p. 189
1880-85 36.9 21.0 Easterlin 1968, p. 189
1890-95 34.3 19.5 Easterlin 1968, p. 189
1900-1905 30.0 17.6 Easterlin 1968, p. 189
1910-15 27.5 14.7 Easterlin 1968, p. 189
1925-30 21.5 10.6 Easterlin 1968, p. 189
1935-40 18.3 11.3 Easterlin 1968, p. 189
1945-50 24.5 9.9 Easterlin 1968, p. 189
1955-60 24.6 9.4 Easterlin 1968, p. 189
1973 15 9 UN, via Population Reference
Bureau 1976
Russiab 1861 48.8 36.1 Biraben, via Heer 1968, table 1
1870 47.0 34.0 Biraben, via Heer 1968, table 1
1880 47.2 34.8 Biraben, via Heer 1968, table 1
1890 47.2 35.4 Biraben, via Heer 1968, table 1
1900 48.1 30.2 Biraben, via Heer 1968, table 1
1910 46.0 28.7 Biraben, via Heer 1968, table I
USSR 1927 41.6 20.9 Biraben, via Heer 1968, table 1
1950 26.5 9.6 Biraben, via Heer 1968, table I
1960 24.9 7.1 Biraben, via Heer 1968, table 1
1965 18.5 7.3 Biraben, via Heer 1968, table I
1973 18 9 UN, via Population Reference
Bureau 1976
aPossible underregistration mentioned explicitly by source.




Country period 1,000 1,000 Source
Japan 1873 23.1 18.9 Bank of Japan 1966, pp. 12-13
1880 24.1 16.5 Bank of Japan 1966, pp. 12-13
1890 28.7 20.7 Bank of Japan 1966, pp. 12-13
1900 32.4 20.8 Bank of Japan 1966, pp. 12-13
1910 34.8 2\.6 Bank of Japan 1966, pp. 12-13
1925 36.3 19.4 Bank of Japan 1966, pp. 12-13
1940 3\.4 16.0 Bank of Japan 1966, pp. 12-13
1950 26.8 10.5 Bank of Japan 1966, pp. 12-13
1955 19.0 7.9 Bank of Japan 1966, pp. 12-13
1960 17.1 7.5 Bank of Japan 1966, pp. 12-13
1964 18.6 7.3 Bank of Japan 1966, pp. 12-13
1973 19 6 UN, via Population Reference
Bureau 1976
Undivided 1881-91 49 41 Kingsley Davis, via Postan and
India Habakkuk 1965, table 16
1891-1901 46 44 Kingsley Davis, via Postan and
Habakkuk 1965, table 16
1901-11 49 43 Kingsley Davis, via Postan and
Habakkuk 1965, table 16
1911-21 48 47 Kingsley Davis, via Postan and
Habakkuk 1965, table 16
1921-31 46 36 Kingsley Davis, via Postan and
Habakkuk 1965, table 16
1931-41 45 31 Kingsley Davis, via Postan and
Habakkuk 1965, table 16
Independent 1950-55 40 25 UN, via Postan and Habakkuk,
India table 16
1973 35 15 UN, via Population Reference
Bureau 1976
Mexico 1895-99 47.3 34.4 Collver 1965, table 41
1900-04 46.5 33.4 Collver 1965, table 41
1905-09 46.0 32.9 Collver 1965, table 41
1920-24 45.3 28.4 Collver 1965, table 41
1925-29 44.3 26.7 Collver 1965, table 41
1935-39 43.5 23.5 Collver 1965, table 41
1940-44 43.8 2\.8 Collver 1965, table 41
1945-49 44.5 17.8 Collver 1965, table 41
1950-54 45.0 15.4 Collver 1965, table 41
1955-59 45.8 12.5 Collver 1965, table 41
1973 46 8 UN, via Population Reference
Bureau 1976
Egypt 1906 43.2 23.6 Nassef 1970, table D.2





Country period 1,000 1,000 Source
Egypt (cont.) 1925 43.5 26.5 Nassef 1970, table D.2
1935 41.3 26,4 Nassef 1970, table D.2
1950 44.2 19.0 Nassef 1970, table D.2
1960 42.9 16.9 Nassef 1970, table D.2
1973 38 15 UN, via Population Reference
Bureau 1976
Taiwan 1920-24 42 26 Gille 1967, table 1; UN (1973),
table V,4
1925-29 44 23 Gille 1967, table 1; UN (1973),
table V.4
1930-34 46 21 Gille 1967, table 1; UN (1973),
table V,4
1935-39 45 20 Gille 1967, table 1; UN (1973),
table V,4
1940-44 42 18 GiIle 1967, table 1; UN (1973),
table V,4
1945-49 40 15 Gille 1967, table 1; UN (1973),
table V,4
1950-54 46 10 Gille 1967, table 1; UN (1973),
table V,4
1955-59 43 8 Gille 1967, table 1; UN (1973),
table V,4
1960-64 37.2 6 Gille 1967, table 1; UN (1973),
table V,4
1973 23 5 UN, via Population Reference
Bureau 1976
had long lags. In some cases the fact that birthrates were already de-
clining when death rates began their sustained descent can be attributed
to frontier conditions that made fertility higher at the outset than it was
as settlement proceeded. An early frontier stimulus to fertility may help
explain why birthrates were already falling from high levels by the time
death rates began their decline in the United States, Canada, Argentina,
Chile, Australia, New Zealand, and the Russian empire. Less obvious
are the reasons why France was already experiencing declining fertility
by the late eighteenth century, before or contemporaneous with the sus-
tained improvement in life expectancy.
In sharp contrast, other early developers appear to have had pro-
longed periods in which the fall in death rates was not matched by a fall
in birthrates. As shown in figure 1.1 and table 1.1, England and Wales
were in this transitional position between the late eighteenth century211 Child Costs and Economic Development
and the 1870s. The lag in fertility decline was at least as long in Japan,
where birthrates began to fall slightly only after 1925 and did not drop
much until after the defeat of 1945. Japanese experience deserves con-
siderable attention in any overview of the transition. It appears that
even with some allowance for early underregistration of births and infant
deaths, birthrates and death rates were both below 30 per thousand
from the mid-eighteenth century to the early Meiji era.3 Across the Meiji
and Taisho eras (1868-1925), the birthrate rose noticeably while the
death rate either rose slightly or fell slightly, depending on the extent of
early underregistration. Japan thus experienced either a prolonged pe-
riod of high fertility with declining birthrates or a prolonged period of
rising fertility with stable or slightly rising death rates, depending again
on the extent to which births and deaths were underregistered together
in earlier eras. There was also a noticeable lag of the secular fertility
decline behind the fall in death rates in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden,
where death rates dropped from the mid-eighteenth century and birth-
rates did not fall significantly until the 1860s or later. Germany also
experienced stable birthrates and falling death rates across the period
from the 1860s to about 1900.4
A lag of fertility decline behind mortality decline is much more com-
mon among recently developing nations and has generated higher rates
of natural increase than ever prevailed in the transition period for
England, Japan, or the Scandinavian countries. Figure 1.1 and table 1.1
review this point for four recently developing countries. Across the inter-
war period, British India experienced rapid reductions in death rate
without any downward trend in the birthrate. Only since independence
has India had declining birthrates, and the decline has not been large
enough to halt the rise in the rate of natural increase. The same experi-
ence was shared by Egypt, whose birthrates failed to decline before the
Nasser coup and have declined only slightly since. Taiwan also cut its
death rate without cutting births between the 1920s and the early 1950s,
though Taiwan has achieved impressive birthrate reductions in the post-
war era since the flood of immigrants arrived from mainland China. The
most dramatic holdout among those countries in figure 1.1 is Mexico,
whose birthrates have not dropped over three-quarters of a century of
declining peacetime mortality. Developing countries cannot find any
prompt or predictable response of birthrates to death rates in this array
of national experiences.
If the onset of development is marked by an accelerated rise in liter-
acy rates or a trend toward urbanization and industrialization, the same
picture emerges as with the birthrate/death rate comparison. All the set-
tings in which death rates were declining were ones of rising literacy,
school attendance, urbanization, and industrialization. Defining develop-
ment in terms of these changes merely reestablishes that the modern12 Peter H. Lindert
periods of declining mortality without reductions in birthrates were also
periods when "development" was occurring without cutting birthrates in
the aggregate.5
Defining the onset of development as the turning point at which na-
tional product per capita began a sustained rise reduces, but does not
eliminate, the cases of nonfalling birthrates accompanying development.
In England and Wales, product per capita, like the other development
indicators, rose from the mid-eighteenth century to the delayed down-
turn in birthrates in the early 1880s.6 The length of this transition period
would be reduced, however, if we had data on the income progress of
the lower-income, higher-fertility groups: real wage rates, with or with-
out allowing for shifts in the occupational structure, probably did not
begin a sustained ascent until about 1815.7 The period when develop-
ment by all measures touched most segments of English society without
bringing a drop in the aggregate birthrate might thus have been as short
as 1815-80-but this is still a long transition period. Using the product-
per-capita and real-wage yardsticks does not shorten the transition pe-
riod for Japan, since both indicators were rising over most of the period
1873-1925.8 There was probably also an extended period in the nine-
teenth century when by any yardstick economic development was pro-
ceeding in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden without a decline in the
crude birthrate, but there are not enough pre-1860 data on product per
capita and real wage rates for a more positive statement. At any rate,
among the early developers there are some clear cases of birthrate de-
cline lagging far behind any measure of economic development, whereas
no lag at all occurred in other cases.
Among more recently developing countries, using the product-per-
capita orwage yardsticks does narrow the range of experiences involving
development without birthrate declines. In particular, these yardsticks
separate out the cases of India and Egypt. Product per capita did not
begin a sustained rise in India until independence,9 a quarter-century
after the beginning of the decline in crude death rates. Similarly, neither
agricultural product per person nor real agricultural wage rates rose in
Egypt from the turn of the century to 1940.10 Only after midcentury
did product per capita and real wage rates drift upward in both India
and Egypt-and only in this same recent period did birthrates begin a
gradual decline. As far as India and Egypt are concerned, properly
including real income growth in the definition of development eliminates
the transitional phase: birthrates declined when true development began.
Yet other recently developing countries have still had the transitional
phase, violating any simple prediction that development means fertility
decline. Taiwan apparently had rising average incomes as well as rising
literacy for two or three decades before World War II and before the
onset of the fertility decline in the 1950s. Several countries in Latin13 Child Costs and Economic Development
America and the Caribbean have also had development without declin-
ing birthrates. Specifically, since the early 1950s the following twelve
countries had birthrates above 30 per 1,000 and not falling faster than
half a point a year, while also having growth rates in GNP per capita
above 1% a year as well as rising literacy and urbanization: Brazil,
Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Ja-
maica (to 1969), Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.ll
1.2 Three Views of the Lag in Fertility Decline
Both the frequent occurrence and the high variance of the lag of
fertility decline behind development pose serious empirical problems for
any integrated theory relating fertility to modernization. If we are to
know what governs the timing of the start of the eventual fertility de-
cline, our knowledge must be based on a model consistent with the lag
and its variations across social groups and nations, as well as with the
eventual decline. There are at least three theories of the lag in fertility
decline that incorporate a submodel designed to explain why fertility
does drop later on.
The first interpretation of high fertility during early development
posits a threshold of economic consciousness; before this point, atti-
tudinal inertia prevents any conscious individual control of family size.
AccorQing to this view, which is a vague presence in the relevant litera-
ature rather than an explicit contender, couples do not regulate their
fertility except in conforming to traditional rules regarding marriage,
intercourse, and breast-feeding. The early diffusion of modern values
has little influence on family formation practices, perhaps even among
those becoming literate, urbanized, and more prosperous. Whether chil-
dren are becoming more or less costly or valuable is irrelevant simply
because it is not perceived. Only after the development process has
passed some threshold do couples think of the costs and benefits of
children as something that should affect their behavior, and by this time
children are in fact becoming more costly, more of an impediment to the
attainment of the new aspirations. This view contains no obvious way of
predicting which groups or societies will take longer to reach the thresh-
old of economic consciousness, except possibly by juggling the definition
of development so that the same threshold matches the onset of falling
fertility in all cases. It also seems to conflict with other evidence that
even in traditional societies families respond to economic opportunities
and even view children largely in economic terms. It is, however, one
not implausible way of explaining the sometime lag in fertility decline,
one that has not been refuted by any conclusive test.
The second interpretation of the sometime lag has been incorporated
in a recent model of demographic development by Riad Tabbarah and14 Peter H. Lindert
Richard Easterlin.12 This model identifies a threshold at which fertility
switches from being determined by the supply of children (or the "poten-
tial output of children") to being driven downward by the declining de-
mand for children. On this interpretation Homo economicus is not born
after development has advanced to the threshold. He (and she) already
exists in traditional society and in the early phase of modernization as
well. In these early settings, however, couples see children as beneficial
enough so that they want a larger family than they can achieve. The
perceived benefits are not spelled out as economic or noneconomic, but
the early constraints on fertility and completed family size are viewed
as definitely social and biological. Couples' fertility is, as in the first
interpretation, constrained by social codes governing marriage, inter-
course, and breast-feeding, and by their fecundity. Within these con-
straints they leave fertility "unregulated" in order to have as many
children as possible, "as many as God wills."
The dawn of economic development raises fertility, in this model,13
at the same time that it cuts the optimal number of children. Better
living standards raise natality by raising fecundity and possibly by relax-
ing some of the social restrictions on marriage. Development further
raises the probability that children will survive to adulthood, causing
completed family sizes to rise faster than fertility. Yet, at the same time,
economic development is also pulling the desired number of children
down toward the attainable maximum, presumably through the same
socioeconomic mechanisms that bring the secular fertility decline later
on. The threshold arrives when the desired number of children drops
below the attainable number, or when couples perceive this and begin
to bring unwanted births under individual control.
It is possible to conduct a partial test of the underlying assumption
that the supply of children falls below the desired number in the era
before the onset of fertility decline. The partial test consists of calculat-
ing the actual average net economic benefits or costs of an extra child
at the average completed family size. If it turns out that an extra child
brings a net economic cost in this setting, supporters of the supply-of-
children view would be compelled to assert and show either that extra
children would have been of overriding net benefit on noneconomic
grounds or that couples' perceptions were biased toward greater appre-
ciation of child benefits than of child costs. If, on the other hand, it
turns out that extra children would have brought net economic gains to
their parents, critics of the supply-of-children view would have to fall
back to the shakier position that children brought an overriding net
noneconomic cost or that couples perceived economic costs more fully
than they perceived economic benefits. No such test has ever been con-
ducted, though preliminary tests are sketched below. Such tests aside,
it can be agreed that this hypothesis is at least partly correct in focusing15 Child Costs and Economic Development
on basic fecundity and social mores as fertility determinants in the early
phases of development.
I will argue that the evidence makes room for a third interpretation
of the delayed fertility transition, one arguing that the relative costs of
extra children at given parity may not rise until well into the develop-
ment process. It may be that the average desired number of surviving
children was never above the potential number. It may be that fertility
and child survival were widely "regulated" all along by society and by
individual couples through the traditional crude devices-postponement
of marriage, abstinence, withdrawal, and, in some societies, induced
abortion and infanticide. Perhaps succeeding generations of couples
were always vaguely aware of the economic consequences of child-
rearing and were not given strong new incentives to prevent births until
well into the development process. Neither the available evidence on
patterns of birth timing, nor that on stated social norms, nor that on
child costs and benefits yet allows us to reject this view.
This interpretation has not been given the empirical tests it deserves,
partly because the relative cost concept has not been operationally de-
fined and partly because sufficient data have not been gathered on the
economic role of children within households in developing countries.
In the next section I shall define a measure of the relative cost of extra
children that embodies most of our theoretical intuitions about how
changes in the economy affect couples' choices between extra children
and other acquisitions. The measure is next quantified in detail and
applied to aggregate twentieth-century patterns in United States fertility.
Subsequent sections survey some empirical evidence on child-cost pat-
terns in developing countries. It turns out that the relative-child-cost
interpretation escapes rejection in some crude initial tests and poses
again some puzzles that are already before us. Beyond the slight support
given to this interpretation of the delay in fertility transition, the mea-
sure of relative child cost offers a theoretically convenient, and often
empirically workable, way of bringing order to a host of previously
disorderly arguments about how child costs evolve with economic de-
velopment.
Let me stress in advance that the sections that follow pose only very
crude tests of the importance of relative-child-cost movements, and that
even these limited tests caution against the belief that movements in
relative costs explain all of the most interesting aggregate fertility pat-
terns. To test the influence of the relative-child-cost measure, one should
place the measure into direct competition with other socioeconomic and
demographic variables in regressions explaining parts of observed fertil-
ity patterns. That kind of test has been performed only for the twentieth-
century United States, not for the earlier development contexts that are
of prime concern here. The usefulness of the relative-cost measure, and16 Peter H. Lindert
its more available proxies, in accounting for the frequent occurrence of
a lag in the fertility decline is subjected only to a rough test of raw
correlation. It more or less passes this rough test by showing good rea-
sons why the relative cost of an extra child is likely not to have risen in
many early-development settings, yet has surely risen much later on.
Even these limited tests-a few regressions for the United States and
a looser documentation of the correlation between likely relative-cost
movements and fertility trends in developing countries-seem to limit
the explanatory power of arguments about movements in child costs.
Movements in relative child costs cannot explain away all of the cross-
sectional fertility patterns in twentieth-century America. Nor can they
account for the postwar baby boom and bust, though they playa partial
role. Nor do they pass all the simple tests of raw correlation in the ex-
perience of developing countries: they cannot, for example, explain why
fertility has begun to decline somewhat in Egypt and India but not in
Mexico.
It appears that, when this measure is polished up and given its chance,
we will still have to divide our explanations of the most important fer-
tility patterns over time and across socioeconomic groups among these
categories of contributing forces: (l) patterns in relative child costs;
(2) patterns in the relationship of couples' current income prospects to
their prior living standards, a force that can be viewed either as a proxy
for their information costs about different life-styles and modes of child-
rearing or more simply as a parameter of their tastes regarding inputs
per family member; (3) other taste variables; (4) differences in the
supply of the means of contraception; and (5) differences in fecundity.
The relative-child-cost measure does not promise a monocausal explana-
tion of fertility patterns; it only offers a way to organize the standard
vague economic arguments linking secular fertility decline with moderni-
zation and to supplement these with a method of accounting for some
of the absence of fertility decline in many early-development settings.
1.3 The Concept of Relative Child Cost
1.3.1 Basic Features
Rich as our intuitions are about how changes in the economic en-
vironment affect couples' natality incentives, our progress toward con-
verting these intuitive arguments into a manageable and measurable
concept has been surprisingly slow. Calculations have been made of the
absolute dollar costs and benefits of an extra child. Recently these calcu-
lations have been sharpened to include time costs and, in some cases,
to be appropriately specific to different birth orders and parental in-
comes, especially in the United States.14 The arguments about child17 Child Costs and Economic Development
costs and economic development are often stated as assertions that
changes in the economy drive up a child's absolute net cost to his par-
ents. Yet this is an awkward way of discussing child costs for the pur-
poses of analyzing fertility behavior. If a concept of child cost is to be
usable as part of a choice-theoretic framework for analyzing controlled
fertility, it must at least separate out price influences in the couples'
environment from influences stemming proximately from their tastes
and incomes. Treating child costs as an absolute net dollar magnitude
fails to meet this standard, even though knowing the absolute magnitude
has other uses. Even if there were no change in the price signals couples
receive from the economic environment, improvements in their income
prospects alone would affect the amounts they spent on each child.
Shifts in tastes would do the same. When people's incomes go up at
fixed prices of time and commodities, leading them to spend more on
each child, we say that they can afford higher-input children. We do not
say that the "costs" of children have risen in this case, any more than
the higher food expenditures of the rich mean that food "costs" the
rich more. Similarly, if couples' tastes shift toward higher inputs of time
and commodities per family member with given income, referring to this
as a shift that raises the "cost" of a child threatens to confuse taste
effects with couples' responses to changes in the prices they face when
trading with the outside world.
Thus, if needed repairs are to be made to the vague economic concept
of child costs, the first step answers the question, Costs of what kind of
child? For the cost concept to focus on the effect of changing prices that
couples face, it must be an index of the cost of one particular set of time
and commodity inputs, one characteristic of a relevant birth order, child
life expectancy, parental income level, and so forth. It is more workable
when defined as an input price index, not as a measure of net economic
value or of psychic cost or value.
A second step is to resolve the question, Cost to whom? Since the
concept is being developed to analyze private fertility behavior, an index
of the costs facing young couples will be pursued rather than an index
of the costs to society. To limit the task of the present paper, I will focus
more narrowly on the private child costs facing young married couples
over the rest of their lives. No discussion will be given to the possible
domination of husband or wife in marital fertility decision-making or to
the decisions of unmarried couples regarding intercourse and marriage,
though changes in child costs might even have an effect on these pre-
marital decisions.
The final question to be faced in deciding on the basic features of a
workable child-cost measure is, Cost relative to what? The arguments
about the evolution of child costs presume that this evolution affects
fertility decision-making within a context of household choice, analogous18 Peter H. Lindert
to the models of consumer choice that derive demand functions from
taste, relative prices, and an income constraint. For this analogy to
retain its value it is essential that the price concept be one of relative
price, again not one of absolute value of expenditures. The relative cost
of an extra child can be said to change only if exogenous changes in the
prices of goods and services change the ratio of the input price of a child
to the input price of the bundle of activities with which an extra child
competes. And it is with some other activities, not with "goods" or
"commodities," that children compete. Parents' enjoyment of children
is a home activity, an output, produced with both time and commodity
inputs, competing with other activities using time and commodities. An
extra child competes for couples' time and commodity resources with
the further development of parents' enjoyment of already-born children
and with activities not related to children.
1.3.2 The Relative-Cost Formula
These basic considerations lead to a formula for the relative cost of
an extra child, a ratio of price indexes that fits into any of several house-
hold optimization models, even ones in which couples choose fertility
regulation strategies rather than childbirth outcomes.15 The first price
index is an index of the prices of the inputs that go into an Nth family
member in a family of given potential income. It is based on the abso-
lute discounted cost of a child's inputs at the expense of his parents'
household, net of the child's economic contribution, over the parents'
entire expected lifetime in some base period.16 The absolute cost of the
child in the base period is:
(1)
where T = the number of years until the couple's lifetime planning
horizon;
St = the probability that the child will survive (and remain
in the parents' household) to age t;
W n = the after-tax dollar wage rate of the nth family mem-
ber, valued at the rate being earned by workers with
that member's attributes at the time of decision;17
LNnt = the nth family member's time input into the extra child
in the tth year, for n=0, ... ,N - 1; for n= N, U"
equals minus the work time contributed by the Nth
family member while still within the household, either
at paid work or at household chores that would have to
have been performed whether or not this extra child
existed;19 Child Costs and Economic Development
C!Vjt = the input of the jth commodity into the extra child in
the lth year; for the years after the child has left the
home, this set of variables reflects the net flow of trans-
fers from parents to child (parents' gifts and bequests
minus support by this child's family);
Pi = its price, at the decision time one year before birth of
the Nth family member; and
r = the rate of discount, discussed below.
The related concept of the absolute cost of a surviving child equals this
same formula with all the survival probabilities, the st's, set at unity.
Note that this absolute input cost is measured net of the child's own
economic contribution to his parents' household and is not a gross mea-
sure of inputs as would be more appropriate for studies of the formation
of human capital in children. While the extra child is still a member of
his parents' household, his contributions of time for paid work and for
chores that would have to be done with or without him are to be sub-
tracted from the time other family members devote to him, in order to
arrive at an estimate for the net time input into him. His earnings at
paid work must also be included in the income of the expanded family
when deducing the effect of the extra child on the family's commodity
consumption. His earnings are implicitly viewed as a substitute for the
same value of earnings on the part of other family members, as though
they are permitted to work less for the same total commodity consump-
tion if he exists. If his contribution to his parents' household turns out
to outweigh the gross discounted cost of his inputs, then of course the
formula yields the child's asset value (times minus one) if the discount
rate is the appropriate rate of return on alternative assets.
Since our present interest is in using this absolute cost formula as part
of a price-ratio index, let us define a cost index of these same child
inputs as
(2) X+J
PN = ~ CjP,
j.=1
(~Ci = 1.00),
where Ps is the index of child input cost,
Pi is the price index for the ith child input, whether the
time of a family member or one of the J commodity
classes, and
Cj is the share of the ith input in total cost in the base
period.
The base period can be a fixed one, as in the 1960-based index used
below. A somewhat better alternative is to use a divisia index as a way
of allowing the share weights in the inputs to vary across temporal and
spatial comparisons. Adjusting the weights as frequently as possible is20 Peter H. Lindert
especially desirable in view of the systematic shifts in relative weights
during the development process, to be documented further below.
The next task is to set up a similar input price index, PH, for the in-
puts going into the "alternative bundle," the extra enjoyment of various
home activities without the extra child. At the level of anyone family,
it would be impossible to observe both this alternative bundle and the
bundle of inputs going into the extra child. If the family has the extra
child, we cannot observe the alternative bundle, the time and commodity
inputs they would have devoted to extra travel, living room furniture,
landownership, and so forth without the child. If they do not have the
extra child, we cannot observe the inputs of time and commodities into
that child. Estimating the impact of an extra child on the family's time
and commodity allocation, like any other estimation of impacts or effects
or causes, involves a counterfactual comparison.
To observe the alternative bundle for comparison with the child input
bundle, use is made of a standard assumption of cross-sectional analysis.
It is assumed that any couple that in fact had, say, a third child would
have followed the same time path of time and commodity inputs over
the (cross-sectionally derived) life cycle as do (two-child) couples with
all the same attributes except for having a third child. In theoretical
terms, this amounts to assuming that the constrained two-child and
three-child optima being compared by the two-child couple in its deci-
sion-making about fertility regulation correspond to the time paths re-
vealed for couples like them (in schooling, age, race, residence, etc.)
having two and three children.
Using this cross-sectional assumption, it is in fact possible to reveal
the time and commodity inputs in the alternative bundle by estimating
all the effects of the extra child on the household's "foreign trade and
payments"-its imports of goods and services, its exports of labor ser-
vices and home-produced goods, and its net savings.
An extra child will raise some commodity imports into the home and
lower others. Imports are raised for those goods used more in child-
rearing than in other home activities. As we shall see below, rearing an
extra child raises food imports considerably, has a smaller effect on
imports of clothing and shelter, and greatly reduces imports of other
commodities. Knowing these import effects allows us to reveal the com-
modity inputs into the alternative bundle. Using the superscript H for
the whole set of activities that are the alternative to having the extra
child, we can express the following identity for each year t





Value of the ith
input devoted to
_ raising the child
Increase in imports
of the ith input
caused by having
the extra child21 Child Costs and Economic Development
in terms of symbols as follows:
(3)
The term on the left side can be revealed by estimating the items on the
right. The CN; values are estimated by studies trying to quantify the
commodity inputs into individual children. The net import effects can
be derived from household expenditure surveys showing the variation
of family expenditures with the number of children for comparable
income and age classes. The resulting figures for the CH/Scan be cross-
checked for plausibility against independent estimates of income elas-
ticities of expenditure.
In calculating the effects of a child on the family's commodity im-
ports, considerable care must be taken to specify correctly the income
the family would have without the child. One cannot simply compare
consumption patterns of families with the same income and different
family size, since family size affects income, both through hours worked
and through wage rates. The arrival of an extra child is often accom-
panied by an immediate reduction in family income, since the wife often
drops out of the labor force. Further family income losses result because
the wife's job is interrupted when the baby arrives. The reduction in her
job experience means that she will tend to receive a lower hourly wage
than if she had not had the child. This job-interruption effect on her
wage rate, like the loss of work hours, lowers the family's income. Partly
offsetting these losses of the wife's income is the net increment to the
father's income: fathers tend to work slightly longer hours to support
their larger families.18 All these effects on the family's labor export
earnings must be taken into account in deriving estimates of the family's
commodities with and without the extra child. The two bundles thus
involve different time paths of household income.
The time taken away from other home activities each year by an extra
child can be estimated by using another identity. For any nth family
member other than the extra child, the fact that total living hours per
year are fixed means:
(4)
where the N superscript is for inputs of time into the Nth family mem-
ber, the H is for activities that are alternatives to having another child,
the L's without superscripts are time spent working for pay in the labor
force, and the bar is for total available time. The value of home time
taken from other home activities during the year t (-LHnt ) can be de-
rived by subtracting any reduction in labor exports from the estimate of
the time put into the extra child (LNnt). The reduction in labor time
exports can be estimated from studies of labor force participation, and
the time spent on an extra child can be estimated from time-use studies.(5)
(6)
(8)
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In this way figures can be derived for all the inputs, both time and
commodity, into the alternative activities. The absolute cost of the alter-
native bundle of inputs can then be measured by the formula:
[Nil WntLH"t + .~ PiCHit]
CostH =::s n=l J~l •
t=o t + 1
(l + r)
The discounted values of the two bundles are not necessarily equal.
They will differ by the effects of the extra child on the family's total
earning potential (for given labor-force participation rates), the effects
of the child on the parents' taxes (in particular, the tax exemption per
dependent), and a technical discrepancy arising from any difference
between the discount rate and the rate of return earned on the parents'
savings, which shift resources between time periods.
The index-number counterpart to costH , or the index of the prices of
inputs into the alternative activities with which the extra child is revealed
to be competing, is
N+J (N+J )
PH = .::s diPi .::s di = 1.00 ,
t=1.00 t=l
where PH is the index of absolute cost of the alternative to having an-
other child, Pi is defined as before, and di is the share of the ith input in
the total cost of the H bundle in the base period.
Now that we have defined indexes for the input costs of the two alter-
natives to be compared, the definition of the relative cost index for an
extra child is simply
(7) Po = PN/PH.
Since Po is a relative price index, we need be concerned only with the
differences in the shares of each input in the two component indexes. It
can be shown that the effect of a given percentage movement in the price
(or wage) of one home input yields a percentage change in the relative
cost of an extra child governed only by the difference in the shares of
that input in the numerator and denominator bundles of inputs:
( t:..Pc) = NiJ(t:.. Pi) X (Ci - di).
Pc t=l Pi
This is a useful simplification of the formula. It means that the magni-
tudes crucial to the behavior of the relative cost index are the net effects
of an extra child on family members' paid work and the household's
total consumption of various classes of commodities, represented by the
term (Ci - di). These effects on the household's foreign trade patterns
are easier to estimate than the actual child inputs, which require consid-(10)
23 Child Costs and Economic Development
erable assumptions about how time and commodities are divided up
within the home. The fact that only differences in the shares make the
index respond to relative input price movements further means that
the weight differences (again, the Ci - di terms) do not obsolesce so
rapidly as households' incomes grow. Income growth will raise the
quantities of commodities going into a child of given parity, but it will
also raise the quantities going into the activities with which children
compete, leaving smaller net effects on the weight differences. It will
turn out below that just a few shifts in weight differences seem to occur
with the process of economic development and income growth, making
the relative cost index move in accordance with a few key movements
in relative prices and weight shifts.
In the event that children turn out to be a net economic asset in the
base period, the formula would have to be modified slightly. In this
situation, the appropriate measure would be an index ratio relating to
the returns from, and the gross inputs into, an extra child. In the numer-
ator would be an index of the prices of the goods and services delivered
by the child to the parents' household, and in the denominator would
be a price index of the gross inputs into the child. Movements in wages
and price would affect this benefit-cost index.
It is worth pausing to reflect on how this concept would be aligned
with the more common household-production frameworks recently used
to develop models of fertility behavior. Within such frameworks the
household budget constraint is often put in nonlinear form. Abstracting
from the specific stage of the life cycle, this budget constraint is some-
thing like:
(9) I = pzZ + pqqn,
where I is the household's total potential income, pz is an index vector
of the prices of inputs into the parents' child-unrelated activities (smok-
ing, adult entertainment, etc.), Z is a vector of the amounts of these
child-unrelated inputs, pq is an index vector of the prices of inputs into
the' children, q is a vector of the average level of inputs per child, and n
is the number of children.19 Abstracting further from the effect of an
extra child on income potential itself and from distinctions between
current children and surviving children, it is clear that the relative cost
of an extra child, the Nth child is
Pc = qPq ,
pq (N - 1) (tiq) + pz (b.z)
where the average inputs level in the numerator (q) is evaluated in the
situation with the extra child and the changes in q and z are caused by
the need to fit the extra child into the budget constraint. This expression
becomes the overall scalar index of relative child cost by letting the p's24 Peter H. Lindert
vary and using the remaining expressions to define the base-period
budget weights.
The input price index in the denominator of expressions 7 and 10 is
a weighted average of the prices of inputs into extra child-unrelated
activities and the prices of inputs into the already-born N - 1 children.
The procedure outlined above for estimating the alternative bundle does
not separate inputs into child-unrelated activities from extra inputs into
raising earlier children. In the present state of our knowledge, it is im-
portant to avoid trying to make that separation. It is very difficult in
practice to identify just which inputs go into child-unrelated activities
and which are inputs into children, the more so since so many home
activities are shared by all family members. Given this difficulty, it is
hard to know to what extent an extra child beyond the first is competing
with "adult consumption aspirations" and to what extent he competes
with higher average inputs for the earlier children, sometimes unhelp-
fully labeled "child quality."20
1.3.3 Actual versus Perceived Costs
The relative cost measure just sketched calls for immense detail on
the average costs of a child to his parents, costs that are "actual" costs
if one accepts the assumed accuracy of effects derived from survey cross
sections. Computing the costs of the child-input bundle and the alterna-
tive bundle is an expensive operation. It took a research assistant and
myself hundreds of hours to settle on a satisfactory set of estimates for
urban United States families in 1960. I would not embark on such a
task just before a fertility-relevant bedtime, and I doubt any peasants
would either. The process of making the calculations is itself economi-
cally unprofitable, since its costs exceed the expected value of the extra
information to the average couple. Of what use can the measurement of
actual child-cost patterns be if young couples could not perceive the true
magnitudes facing them?
To judge the value of measure of actual child costs for fertility analy-
sis, we must begin by rejecting both extreme views. It is as unreasonable
to believe that significant movements in actual relative child costs would
be totally irreTevant as it is to assume that couples make calculations
like the ones sketched here. The shares of parents' income taken up by
the inputs into an extra child are impressive by any measure. It would
be much harder to ignore a given percentage movement in the cost of an
extra child than it would be to ignore a price increase on matches or
cooking pans. The budget constraint is too real, especially at low income
levels. Even illiterate villagers can count, and they know they have no
choice but to make choices.
Interview responses also seem to show some awareness of the eco-
nomic costs and benefits of children in all societies, both when respon-25 Child Costs and Economic Development
dents are asked about these and when they are just asked to extemporize
about the pluses and minuses of children.21 The recent surveys con-
ducted through the East-West Institute suggested that the tendency to
describe the gains and losses from children in explicitly economic terms
was even greater in rural and lower-income groups than in the more
modern settings.22 Furthermore, many responses that are not explicitly
put in monetary terms nonetheless reflect a direct awareness of the time
costs and benefits of children, as when couples mention "too much
responsibility," "career conflicts," "fear of doing a bad job as a parent"
(to previous children), "general freedom and fun conflicts," and "inter-
ference with husband/wife affiliative relationship."
It seems advisable to take an intermediate position, believing that
couples are somehow made aware of some rough outlines of the eco-
nomic costs and benefits of extra children. Since they cannot conceivably
get their information from a direct calculation of these costs and bene-
fits, the best guess is that they gather them indirectly, by hearing about
and observing the fortunes of other couples. Women will tend to hear
more about the agonizing conflict between children and career develop-
ment in settings in which wage rates away from home are high enough
to make the conflict real. Peasants will more readily accept the argument
that feeding an extra child is a terrible burden "in times like these" when
their ability to buy or grow food with child labor is indeed low than
when real wages in terms of food have been higher for some time.
Where housing is rationed and extra rooms are especially scarce, urban
couples will hear from others, if not see for themselves, what problems
come home with an extra child. There are, in other words, plausible
mechanisms through which couples who would never speak in terms of
cost-benefit analysis would nonetheless respond to child costs and bene-
fits, like the man who spoke prose without knowing it.
There remains the problem of deciding which aspects of the actual
costs and benefits couples perceive more clearly and which they tend to
overlook. This problem is not easily resolved. The only workable strat-
egy here is to pursue the various actual cost considerations as far as the
data allow, on the assumption that the perceived importance of any
part of the cost calculation is proportional to its actual quantitative
importance.
1.3.4 The Discount Rate and Parents' Savings
The issue of perceptions carries over into another aspect of the rela-
tive cost formula, an aspect not easily resolved by standard economic
theory. In the formulas for the base-period costs of child inputs and
inputs into the alternative inputs, all magnitudes were discounted back
to a decision-making date one year before the would-be birth. What is
the appropriate discount rate?26 Peter H. Lindert
To some noneconomists, the issue of a discount rate may seem to be
just another symptom of overinvestment in elaborate economic theoriz-
ing. Yet the issue is as inescapable as it is knotty. Its difficulty was
exemplified when one recent seminar participant tried to wave aside the
discount rate as irrelevant on the grounds that "Everybody knows that
people don't plan very far ahead, so it's obvious that the discount rate
is zero." The confusion goes deeper than a mere semantic misunder-
standing over how the economist defines the discount rate, especially
when the behavior of peasants and other low-income groups is being
discussed. On one hand, it is traditional to view them as myopic, which
would make them give much more attention to the early costs of infant-
rearing than to later child costs and benefits. On the other, it is also
traditional to say that children are valued mainly for their income sup-
port for the parents in the distant future. Given the limits on the actual
ratios of future support from children to early child-rearing costs, it is
hard to argue that the discount rate is both high and low.
Economic theory does not suggest a clear choice of discount rate for
the effects of children. The usual guideline is that any investment's
stream of expected costs and returns should be compared with the ex-
pected rates of return on other assets having the same perceived degree
of effect on the riskiness of the decision-maker's entire portfolio. This
is a weak guideline here, since the returns from the child are more non-
economic than for most other assets. The procedure followed in my
child-cost calculations for the urban United States in 1960 has been to
calculate all values under a wide range of discount rates running from
the unlikely zero rate up to 18% per annum, with preferred rates being
13% for low-income couples (near the private rate of return on col-
lege) and 8% per annum for high-income couples (near the private
rate of return on graduate education).23 In what follows, readers will
want to note that their own views about the myopia or hyperopia of
young couples will tip the scales toward or away from those effects of a
child that come soon after birth.
Also complicated, but having lesser effect on the quantitative patterns
in child costs, is the issue of the effect of children on their parents'
savings in nonhuman form. Over the years in their parents' household,
children tend to reduce the parents' savings, though this tendency is
mitigated by the children's contribution to family capital formation in
many agricultural settings. A careful calculation of the whole lifetime
streams of costs and benefits of an extra child must weigh in the fact
that the child may cause the parents to dissave and pull their use of
resources toward the present at the expense of consumption and leisure
in the more distant future. Less clear is whether parents make up this
dissaving by the end of their expected life-span. If they had strict targets
for the inheritances to be left to each child, they would more than make27 Child Costs and Economic Development
up the lost saving in order to allow the extra child his target bequest.
If they do not or cannot meet such targets, the effect of the extra child
on their savings may be negative even by the time they die. The impact
of family size on the final bequests of decedents is empirically unre-
solved, and an assumption about terminal savings would have to be
made for any detailed calculation of child costs. Elsewhere I have as-
sumed that terminal savings are unaffected by the extra child, though
the quantitative importance of this assumption looks slight.24
1.3.5 The Rise of Average Child Inputs and the Role of Tastes
The relative-cost concept thus defined may seem too narrow to cap-
ture all that we think of when discussing the effect of rising child costs
on fertility. In particular, one may suspect that there are aspects of the
secular rise in average inputs per child that ought to be called a rise in
average child "costs" facing succeeding generations of young adults.
This suspicion of narrowness has taken two forms in past discussion of
the cost issue.
One suspicion, prompted by the use of other household-production-
function models, is that the concept as defined here overlooks the simple
point that increases in average child inputs drive up the "price" of an
extra child. In the language usually used in such models, increases in
child quality drive up the shadow price on child quantity. Yet this way
of putting it does not specify either the alternatives with which children
are being compared or the reasons why higher average inputs per child
clearly raise their unit price relative to any commodity, though not rela-
tive to an hour of time. Average inputs are on the rise not only for a
child, but for other home activities as well. Vacations, entertainment,
home improvements, and other activities also absorb rising average in-
puts. It is not clear that children are rising in price relative to these
activities, except to the extent that changes in input prices make such
an overall relative price change show in the measure as defined here. In
addition, the rise in average inputs, when it occurs for reasons not re-
lated to changes in relative input prices, is a force that needs to be
explained in terms of tastes and incomes.
The other suspicion is that as incomes grow and development pro-
ceeds, people find children increasingly costly in the sense that their
upbringing and social position leave them "no choice" but to buy more
"costly" children. These forces are real enough. They could in fact be
defined as shifts in tastes or as shifts in relative child cost, though this
latter approach would have to follow an unconventional route. To make
the influence of upbringing and social surroundings an influence on child
costs, one would have to erect a plausible but empirically elusive argu-
ment about information costs. One could plausibly argue that being
brought up on, and surrounded by, higher living standards raises the28 Peter H. Lindert
cost to young couples of finding out how they could manage to rear a
child with lower inputs. Conversely, their greater familiarity with high-
input modes of child-rearing lowers the cost to them of such children
relative to lower-input children and the alternatives to lower-input chil-
dren. Yet any such attempt to work the influence of upbringing and
social surroundings into a cost concept overburdens the concept and
removes it from its usual choice-theoretic role. It is simpler, and more
productive of interdisciplinary cooperation in research on fertility, to
put such influences into the categories of income effects and taste effects,
leaving the cost measure to pick up only shifts in observable input price
ratios.
1.4 An Application to the United States in the Twentieth Century
To clarify how child costs have changed with the process of economic
development, I shall first take advantage of the relative abundance of
survey data for the postwar urban United States. It is possible to calcu-
late the entire lifetime profiles of parents' use of time and commodities
for a first child, a third child, and the activities these replace, for "low-
income" and "high-income" couples in the urban United States in 1960.
Several data bases have been combined to generate the lifetime profiles.
First a low-income and a high-income husband were chosen with refer-
ence to 1960 census data on incomes, the former having an hourly rate
of pay rising from $1.31 at age 23 to a peak of $2.28 by age 47 and
the second earning from $2.25 an hour at age 23 to $5.15 by age 52.
Their wives were given corresponding wage rates. The wives' wage rates,
their working hours, and husbands' working hours were all allowed to
vary with childbearing experience in accordance with estimates derived
from cross-sectional studies. Given these family income profiles (and
some savings effects caused by child-rearing), the next step was to esti-
mate the time and commodity inputs into a first child, born on the
parents' 24th birthday, and a third child, born on the parents' 30th
birthday. The time inputs were estimated from the 1967-68 Cornell
time-use survey in Syracuse, and the commodity inputs and net effects
of the child on family consumption patterns were estimated from the
1960-61 Survey of Consumer Expenditures and some USDA guesses
about child inputs based on the same data. The child was assumed to
survive his parents in each case. This set of procedures generated the
set of 1960 estimates shown in tables 1.2 through 1.5.25
The tables reveal several patterns in the differences between child
inputs and the inputs into alternative activities. Regarding commodity
inputs, all four tables show that an extra child raises the family's con-
sumption of food, regardless of income level, birth order, or the dis-
count rate. That is, a greater value of food enters as an input into the29 Child Costs and Economic Development
child than would have been purchased by the household in pursuit of
other extra enjoyments without the child. This food intensity of extra
children is not confined to the United States. Household budget surveys
from at least 17 countries have also shown that extra children raise the
share budgeted for food. 26 The prevalence of this pattern suggests a not-
so-surprising corollary to Engel's law: extra dependents, like poverty,
raise the share spent on food.
The effect of an extra child on housing expenditures proves slightly
negative in all cases except the first child of a low-income couple. This
negative effect prevails in most other household budget surveys as well.
It runs counter to the natural belief that extra children require more
room and should force their parents into purchasing it. The negative
shelter effect does not really contradict this belief. The extra children
are simply forcing their parents to make cuts somewhere in order to
feed them, and part of the cuts come at the expense of total shelter
expenditures. Detailed studies of the demand for specific housing char-
acteristics seem to resolve the puzzle by showing that larger families in
fact consume more site space as well as more rooms yet cut their expen-
ditures on centrality of location and other dimensions of housing quality
so much as to bring a net reduction in shelter expenditures with larger
family size.27 This means that merely following the overall consumer
price index for shelter may hide important information about the drift
in the relative cost of the kind of housing that is most relevant to chil-
dren. If site space and extra rooms are rising faster in price, or becom-
ing more severely rationed, than housing in general, then the relative
cost of extra children may be rising in a way that the available figures
cannot reveal.
Another clear pattern of commodity intensity is that children are
luxury-sparing rather than luxury-intensive. That is, they tend to reduce
household consumption of highly income-elastic commodities, as shown
by the negative share differentials for "all other" on the right in tables
1.2 through 1.5. It would be highly desirable to break down this large
residual category further to identify more fully just which luxury goods
are most strongly associated with the alternative input bundle. With such
information, it would be possible to be more selective in choosing price
indexes for measuring the relative cost of an extra child across time and
space. For the present, however, it is necessary to stick to the general
observation that luxury goods are heavily associated with the alternative
life-styles with which extra children compete.
Tables 1.2 through 1.5 also quantify the time inputs into children and
into the alternatives to children. The gross adult time cost accounts for
about half the total cost of either a first or a third child at the preferred
discount rates (13% in tables 1.2 and 1.3,8% in tables 1.4 and 1.5).































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.38 Peter H. Lindert
for a first child than for a third. Virtually aU these hours fall as a burden
on the mother, since the Syracuse time-use survey, like every other time-
use survey, shows that the mother's child-care time far outweighs that of
the father and accounts for most of the total care time, regardless of
socioeconomic class or nation of residence.28
It is also clear that an extra child, especially a firstborn, is time inten-
sive in the postwar urban United States. That is, the time inputs into the
child exceed in economic value the time supplied by the child. Figure 1.2
develops this point further by showing an age profile of the time costs
and contributions of the child, which will be compared with similar
measures for other countries below. Figure 1.2 shows not only that a
child is time-intensive in this setting, but also that he causes a net reduc-
tion in the household's earnings, even after his own slight teenage earn-
ings are taken into account. Firstborns take a greater share of their total
time demands away from the parents' paid work than do third-borns on
the average, since firstborns tend to pull the mothers away from a job
while third-borns tend to pull already housebound mothers away from
other household work and leisure.29
The net time-intensity of these modern prototypes looks even higher
at positive discount rates, since the time costs are concentrated in in-
fancy while the time contributions from each child come at a much later
age. Another adjustment would also raise the time-intensity somewhat.
The calculations in tables 1.2 through 1.5 have valued the time inputs
into the child at the wife's child-burdened wage rate. This convention
makes no allowance for the fact that the arrival of the child cuts the
mother's wage rate, through lost work experience, as well as her hours
of work. This loss of her earning potential equals a large figure some-
thing like the differences in total bundle values at the bottoms of tables
1.2 through 1.5. This loss of on-the-job investment in subsequent pay
raises could reasonably be added to the value of the time inputs into
the child. Doing so would raise the time-intensity of a child and make
the relative cost index more sensitive to movements in real wage rates
than it is here.
The 1960 weights for time and commodity inputs in tables 1.2
through 1.5 can be combined with aggregate price and wage series to
generate a relative cost index that moves over time. Using the weights
from tables 1.2 and 1.3, covering the more representative lower-income
families, yields the time series on relative child costs shown in figure 1.2
and table 1.6.
The one time period in which the fixed bundles of child inputs clearly
became cheaper relative to the alternative bundle was during World
War II. The cheapening of children was caused by the sudden entry of
a majority of families into the ranks of income-tax-payers between 1940
and 1945. For the new taxpayers the income-tax exemptions for de-39 Child Costs and Economic Development
pendents became relevant for the first time, dropping the cost of a first-
born by 9% and the cost of a third-born by 16%-more than enough
to outweigh the increases in relative child cost implied by the wartime
rise in real wage rates.
Aside from World War II, there has been a slow but unmistakable
rise in relative child costs, caused by the leverage of rising real wage
rates on the cost of time-intensive children. This suggests that economic
development may monotonically raise relative child costs by raising real
12 14 16 17 Age of
firstborn
















Fig. 1.2 Value of time taken and supplied by firstborn and third-
born children, urban United States children, 1967-68 time
use and 1960 work effects at 1960 "low-income" wage rates.
From Lindert (1978). (l) child-care time by all persons, at
wife's wage rates; (2) other chore time increases for wife;
(3) net loss of paid work by parents; (4) child's chore plus
paid work contribution; (5) child's paid work, a part of (4).Table 1.6 Relative Cost Indexes for a First and a Third Child,
Urban United States. 1900-1970
First Child
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ditto, Ad- Price of Relative
Price of justed for Inputs into Child
Inputs into Income-Tax Alternative Cost
the Child Exemption Activities Index
Year (PN) (P'x) (PH) (P'l'/PH)
1970 137.32 138.56 134.83 1.0276
1965 111.09 111.85 108.57 1.0302
1960 100.00 100.00 100.00 1.0000
1955 87.10 87.13 88.24 .9996
1950 75.21 75.80 77.48 .9783
1945 52.86 51.74 57.10 .9061
1940 41.72 44.59 45.64 .9771
1935 39.20 41.90 43.88 .9549
1933 35.23 37.66 41.46 .9083
1930 43.78 46.80 49.63 .9929
1925 45.10 48.21 50.76 .9844
1922 42.36 45.28 48.97 .9246
1920 43.82 46.84 49.38 .9485
1919 41.09 43.92 43.85 1.0016
1914 23.74 25.38 27.15 .935
1910 22.39 23.93 26.03 .919
1900 18.92 20.22 22.86 .885
Third Child
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1970 137.06 139.21 136.18 1.0223
1965 110.90 112.22 110.16 1.0187
1960 100.00 100.00 100.00 1.0000
1955 87.36 87.40 87.44 .9996
1950 75.68 76.72 75.70 1.0134
1945 53.09 51.04 54.54 .9357
1940 41.59 46.61 43.80 1.0643
1935 39.29 44.04 41.28 1.0668
1933 35.19 39.44 38.22 1.0319
1930 44.10 49.43 46.68 1.0589
1925 45.45 50.94 48.09 1.0593
1922 42.61 47.76 45.71 1.0448
1920 45.00 50.44 45.61 I.l058
1919 42.03 47.11 41.83 1.1262
1914 24.12 27.03 25.47 1.0612
1910 22.69 25.43 24.31 1.0461
1900 19.10 21.41 20.96 1.021541 Child Costs and Economic Development
wage rates. Yet, as we shall see below, this implication cannot be drawn
for early stages of development, since children have become time-inten-
sive only in later stages.
Figure 1.3 and table 1.6 might seem to encourage the view that move-
ments in relative child costs explain the United States postwar fertility
waves, in view of the wartime dip just before the onset of the baby boom
and the rise in costs before the baby bust of the 1960s and 1970s. Yet
several alternative regressions reported elsewhere assign only a more
limited role to relative cost movements. The most generous regression
result credits the wartime decline in the relative cost of a third-born
with a significant but small part of the fertility rise of the 1940s and of
the fertility decline across the 1960s.30 Across the 1950s, on the other
hand, fertility rose slightly while relative costs also rose. These results
suggest that movements in relative costs have played a role in recent
fertility fluctuations, yet fall far short of fully accounting for them.
1.5 Are Extra Children Ever Economic Assets?
The cost of a surviving child in the contemporary United States is so
high that the initial question to ask about the evolution of child costs
with development is simply whether a newborn child offered more ex-
pected benefits than costs to his parents in a context of economic under-
development. This is commonly presumed but has never been empirically
demonstrated. It is not easy to quantify the net gains from a child in a
setting in which much of the economic exchange between children and
adults never enters the marketplace. Either of two kinds of data would
be required. One would be detailed survey data on time use within
households in a less developed economy, supplemented by data on the
commodity consumption patterns of the same households. The other
would be market valuations of child services and child support in set-
tings where children are managed for profit by nonparents. Fortunately,
both kinds of data are just now becoming available, some from the early
history of the currently industrialized countries and some from con-
temporary surveys in developing countries. The data are so scattered
across nations and time that the present empirical picture must be a very
incomplete mosaic.
A starting point for judging the cost or asset value of a newborn child
in an underdeveloped economy is the available historical data on the
economics of managing a child for profit. Slaveowners in the United
Source: Table 1.6 and figure 1.3 were calculated from the 1960 "low-income"
bundle weights in tables 1.2 and 1.3, plus time series on tax exemptions, wage

























































































































































































































































































































































































































.43 Child Costs and Economic Development
States South had a great stake in correct appraisal of the survival
chances, work capacity, and costs of support of slave children. They
had to appraise not only the child's consumption and productivity in
producing salable crops, but also his potential for chores on the planta-
tion and the minimal time spent by all adults in supervising the child
at the expense of other tasks. Given these considerations and the child-
labor-intensity of cotton to be documented further below, one can as-
sume that if any newborn children were a net asset, slave children were.
The fact that newborn slave children had a positive market value in
the antebellum South shows an extreme upper bound on the average
value of a newborn to his parents in an agriculture where modernization
has not proceeded beyond such implements as the cotton gin. This
market value shows what a parent could expect from a live birth if he
not only worked his child like a slave but kept receiving all the returns
from the productivity of any surviving child beyond slave-level con-
sumption for the child until the parent's death. This is an extreme case
of parent exploitation, of course, since most children leave home at
about age twenty and give their parents much less support than was
extracted by slaveowners. To improve the analogy with the parent's
investment, one must look more closely at the effects of a slave child in
his first twenty years, temporarily setting aside old-age support for the
parent.
The cost and earnings of a slave child were roughly quantified for
1846-50 in the pioneering work of Conrad and Meyer.31 Their esti-
mates of the costs and returns from slave children by age and sex can
be combined with Robert Evans's estimates of age-specific survival rates
for slave children in 1850.32 The Conrad-Meyer estimates imply that
over the first twenty years of life, including the initial costs in nursery
and the mother's work loss, a surviving slave child brought an undis-
counted net return of $194. The rate of return on a guaranteed survivor
was just below 8% per annum, while the rate of return on a live birth
given the infant and child mortality rates works out to have been be-
tween 6% and 7%. These rates of return, while below those reckoned
on adult slaves (8-14%), are positive and imply that a child raised in
the manner of a slave could be a slight net asset even without including
any expected value of old-age support. And the true rate of return over
the slave's life may have been slightly higher than this synthetic cross-
sectional estimate for 1846-50, given the moderate growth in slave
productivity across the antebellum era. Thus far, a slave childhood
seems to have been slightly profitable to the slaveowner.
These estimates of slave-child profitability should be cross-checked
against other data on the same issue, since the Conrad-Meyer estimates
are really their own interpolations based on adult slave productivity and
scraps of information on the ages at which slave children began work(11)
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and began to make back their upkeep. We can judge the profitability
of a slave's childhood years from the more reliable data on slave pur-
chase prices in the New Orleans slave market, hire rates and upkeep
costs for adult slaves, and, again, Evans's survival rates. Given that pros-
pective slaveowners had the alternative option of buying adult slaves,
it is reasonable to assume that they would have discounted the expected
returns and costs of a slave childhood at a rate of return similar to that
earned on an adult slave. While the original profitability estimates for
adults by Conrad and Meyer had been exposed to a number of criti-
cisms, there is general agreement that the cross-sectional rate of return
on adult slaves for the 1850s would be between 8% and 14% per
annum.33 Given this range of the adult rate of return, r, we can relate
the market prices on newborns (Po) and 20-year-olds (P20 ) to the im-
plied present value of the first twenty years of the slave child's life
(PVO-20 ) by the formula
Po = PVO-20 + S20P20
(1 + r)20'
where S20 is the perceived share of newborns surviving to age 20, as-
sumed to equal Evans's estimate for 1850. In this case we get something
close to a zero net profit on a slave childhood. The present value of the
childhood years, PVO-20, is - $42 if the survival-weighted value of a
20-year-old is discounted at 8%, and +$47 if a discount rate of 14%
is applied.34 I infer that if parents in an agricultural setting like that of
the antebellum South had discounted uncertain future costs and returns
at rates like those revealed by cross sections of slaveownership, and had
exploited their children like slaves, the net economic value of raising a
child who would leave the home at 20 would be about zero.
The economic flows between a freeborn child and his parents in
underdeveloped settings can only be judged, as mentioned, with the
help of extensive data on the exchanges of time use within the house-
hold. Fortunately, rural time-use studies have recently been conducted
in the Philippines, Java, and Nepal.35 Of these, the most extensively
surveyed was also the most affluent. A survey in rural Laguna in the
Philippines gathered data on time use in 571 households in May, June,
and July 1975. The surveyed barrios were rural, but not remote: just
south and east of Los Banos, and within transistor-radio distance of
Manila, about 60 miles away. The season was one of intensive crop
cultivation, perhaps raising work time by women and children above
the annual average. On the other hand, school began in June, probably
cutting productive work time by some of the children. The survey mea-
sured the allocation of time across several activities for a recent week.
While there were some problems in coding time spent on several activi-4S Child Costs and Economic Development
ties at once, the data are not too different in concept from those from
recent United States time-use surveys. Earnings were estimated directly,
and the values of other home productive work were imputed with the
help of data on likely wage rates for hiring out different home tasks.36
Tentative regression results from the Laguna survey reveal the time
costs and contributions of a second-born or later-born child.37 These are
plotted in figure 1.4. The time spent by the parents on child care (series
1) refers to care of preschool children only.38
Perhaps surprisingly, the extra child does not reduce the parents'
earnings over his first twenty years in their household.3~ There is a no-
ticeably positive effect of extra children on the working hours of fathers
in Laguna. Whether owing to a feeling of extra responsibility or to a
greater desire to get away from the house and children, this "moon-
lighting father" effect appears to be somewhat stronger in Laguna than
in the postwar nonfarm United States.40 A dearer contrast with con-
temporary United States patterns of behavior is the effect of the extra
child on the mother's income-generating work. This effect is negative,
as one would expect, for the first year after birth (a work loss of 5.3
hours a week) but is essentially zero thereafter. The explanation seems
to be simply that in rural Laguna, as in all the other rural settings for
which relevant data have been gathered, the mother's various produc-
tive tasks are all so close to home that she can juggle her schedule and
combine tasks so as to avoid any great personal work loss from an extra
child. The net result is that an extra child, although he has a positive
adult-time cost within the home, actually raises the parents' work hours
and earnings.41
The extra child contributes to his parents' household a good deal
more time than he takes. Here it is only possible to report the average
value of productive time use by all children over the age of 7 rather
than to give a detailed age profile. It is nonetheless clear from figure
1.4 that children contributed more time, both in all productive tasks
and in income-earning work, than they took from their parents. Chil-
dren in rural Laguna are clearly time-supplying, not time-intensive like
their urban United States counterparts. In such a setting, any general
increase in rural real wage rates on common labor would apparently
make an extra child look less costly relative to the alternative life-styles
with which he competed in his parents' household.
To judge whether the net time contribution of the extra child is suffi-
cient to make him a net asset, we need data on the commodity inputs
concerned. Values of the food, clothing, educational, and other inputs
into an extra child in Laguna are now being tabulated. As a preliminary
conservative guess, one can combine Lorimer's crude consumption-
equivalence scales for children and adults with the Laguna income data46 Peter H. Lindert
to put peso values on the likely consumption of commodities by the
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Fig. 1.4 Average time-use effects, commodity consumption, and
work effects of an extra child in a household with children,
by age of the extra child-rural Laguna, Philippines, 1975.
From Boulier 1976, tables lA, I1A, IlIA. (1) preschool
child care time by the parents (+ = cost); (2) average
time contribution of a child over 7, all productive work;
(3) crude estimate of the child's commodity consumption,
using Lorimer consumption-equivalent scales; (4) average
earnings of a child over 7; (5) effect on earnings of the
two parents (+ = loss of earnings). Net cost of the child
is approximated by (l) + (3) - (2).47 Child Costs and Economic Development
It tentatively appears that a surviving later-born child would bring a
slight net cost to his parents while growing up within their household,
since the excess of the child's time contribution over time cost is not
quite sufficient to match the commodity cost. To be sure, the net cost of
the child turns out to be much lower as a share of household income or
of an adult male's average earnings than in the postwar United States.
Yet thus far it appears that the extra rural Filipino child is not a net
economic asset to his parents while still a child. If this conclusion stands
up to further evidence, it contrasts the freeborn rural child to the slave
child. More important, it provides some tentative support for Eva Muel-
ler's suspicions against the view that a newborn child is a net economic
asset in underdeveloped rural economies.43
The net preadult costs of an extra child in the rural Laguna area
would be reinforced by some conservative biases in the measures shown
in figure 1.4. First, the time costs of the child have been underestimated
by the exclusion of care for them by nonparents, by excluding measures
of their effect on the mother's cleaning-up chores and meal preparation
time, and by the already-noted bias related to the care of younger sib-
lings by older siblings. Second, a firstborn child would receive more
time inputs than the later-borns. Third, the figures all refer to a surviv-
ing child, and any net benefits from a child at the older ages that might
appear if the estimates in figure 1.4 were optimistically revised would be
reduced by mortality in greater proportion than the clearly positive net
costs in the infant years. Finally, if one takes the position that parents
psychically discount more distant effects at a positive discount rate, then
the immediate net costs of pregnancy (omitted here) and infancy loom
proportionately larger.
Some additional useful fragments of information on the net-asset
issue are provided by two other recent time-use surveys, one for a Java-
nese village and another for the low-ranking Thami caste in a Nepalese
village, both conducted in 1972-73.44 These data sets have the advan-
tage of applying to a less-developed rural setting than the Philippine
sample. They are also based on extensive interviews spread out over
more than a year. They have the disadvantage of relating to fewer house-
holds-20 in Java and 45-50 in Nepal-and supplying less detailed
information on some key variables. Nonetheless, they do offer another
look into the uses of time within rural households, beyond what data on
market work alone can reveal.
Table 1.7 sketches the time contributions of children over 6 years old
in these two villages. Their overall contribution ("all work") is a much
larger share of adult male work time than would be contributed by
the same ages and sexes in the postwar United States, and even a
somewhat larger share than contributed in the rural Philippine sample.48 . Peter H. Lindert
It is also larger than the total child-care time per household contributed
by all adults in the village in Java, suggesting that the children in the
Javanese and Nepalese cross sections, like those in the rural Philippines,
are net suppliers of time and not time-intensive activities for their par-
ents' household.45 These time contributions, however, must be weighted
by the average wage rate or productivity of the working children, who
presumably earned at a lower hourly rate than adult males. Table 1.7
reminds us that the work-time ratios greatly overstate the work-value
ratios of children to adults, by showing how the fact that the average
child's wage rate was only half the adult male rate cut into the relative
value of children's work contribution in rural Egypt in 1964-65.
To reach a conclusion about the net economic value of the hypo-
thetical cross-sectional newborn child in rural Java or Nepal, one would
again need data on commodity consumption by children and also on
their survival chances. These are currently lacking for the Java and
Nepal samples. One can only suggest that if the ratios of consumption
patterns to adult male earnings are comparable to those in Laguna, the
somewhat higher time contribution of the Javanese and Nepalese chil-
dren would bring them closer to the margin of being net assets to their
parents.
It thus appears possible that in underdeveloped rural settings an extra
child could have been a slight net asset. The Philippine data tentatively
argue in favor of the opposite view, but for the United States slave econ-
omy and Javanese and Nepalese villages, the net benefits may have been
positive. At the moment, the net-asset issue remains unresolved for truly
underdeveloped economies.4G Yet two clear patterns are emerging: chil-
dren were much less of a net burden as a share of family or adult male
income in these cases than in developed countries, and children were
clearly time supplying.
Rough calculations like these serve to bring out a further point relat-
ing to the historical decline in infant and child mortality. It is common
to argue that couples set a target number of surviving children and
respond, with a lag, to declining infant and child mortality by having
fewer births now that fewer are needed to achieve the target. The pre-
sumption deserves further empirical tests, in view of the ease of presum-
ing an opposing model of tastes in which couples react to the death of
children by becoming less sanguine about having others. The age profiles
of child costs and benefits now remind us of another basis for challeng-
ing the usual view: children invariably start out as a net cost and become
net benefits only after nine or more years. This means that high mor-
tality is a force holding up the net costliness of a live birth or pregnancy
by limiting the shares surviving to the net-benefit phase. When infant
and child mortality decline with the onset of modernization, the improve-49 Child Costs and Economic Development
Table 1.7 The Work Inputs of Rural Javanese, Nepalese, and Egyptian
Children of Various Age-Sex Groups Expressed as Percentages
of the Average Work Inputs of Male Adults
6-8 Years 9-11 Years 12-14 Years 15-19 Years
A. Javanese Village
All Work
Boys 43 38 56 91
Girls 39 62 99 120
Directly Productive Work
Boys 23 24 42 71
Girls 15 39 59 86
B. Nepalese Village
All Work
Boys 37 65 73 93
Girls 47 82 96 110
Directly Productive Work
Boys 37 61 69 93
Girls 30 71 81 98
6-11 Years 12-15 Years 16-19Years
33.2
16.7
C. Rural Egypt, 1964-65
All Work Outside the Household
Boys, % of adult male work
inputs 14.1 69.3
% of adult male earnings:a 7.1 34.9
Girls, % of adult male work
inputs 8.7





Sources: Table 7: a and b, Nag 1976, table 5; c, Mueller 1976, table III-3, and
Hansen 1969, p. 308. The reference to adult males in Java and Nepal is to an
average work input for all sampled males over 15. This input into "all work" was
about 8.5 hours a day in the Javanese village and about 10 hours a day in the
Nepalese village.
Note: na = not available.
aAssuming that the average ratio of child to adult-male daily wage rates of .503
applied to all age-sex groups.
ment in survival chances may make a newborn seem like more of a net
asset or less of a liability. There are, in other words, good theoretical
reasons for remaining agnostic on the link between child mortality and
fertility. The facts have also held back their support: infant mortality
shows a significantly positive effect on fertility in some cross sections50 Peter H. Lindert
but not others and remains subject to suspicions of having taken credit
for influences that are due to omitted variables.
1.6 Old-Age Support
It is traditional to argue that in underdeveloped economies parents
expect and receive considerable support from their surviving children in
their old age. This is assumed to be one of the main reasons why chil-
dren are net assets in less developed countries. The decline in this reli-
ance on children is traditionally thought to be one of the main ways
economic development reduces fertility. The evidence for this view
comes in three forms.
The most directly relevant evidence comes from interviews on the
perceived importance of old-age support and its relationship to the case
for having children. The evidence seems to form a neat pattern: time,
development, and urbanization all reduce the stated importance of fu-
ture old-age support from children. In the East-West Center's surveys
in East Asia and Hawaii in the early 1970's, old-age support was more
frequently mentioned as an advantage of having children by rural than
by urban respondents, and its frequency by nation correlated inversely
with national income per capita.47 A generation of family-planning sur-
veys in Japan found young wives' "willingness to depend" on their
children in their old age steadily declining from over half in 1950 to a
quarter in 1971, with rural wives more willing to depend than urban.48
A second kind of evidence is cross-sectional regression evidence that
fertility is significantly lower in countries with social insurance benefits
established for the elderly, other variables held equa1.49
The final form of evidence is data on coresidence of parents and
grown children. Elderly parents clearly live with their children more
often in less developed economies.50 The breakup of intergenerational
coresidence over the course of development is even more pronounced
than the usual data on residence in the same household can reveal, since
the tendency of elderly parents to live nearby in the same village has
also declined, a fact that has complicated recent research on the evolu-
tion from extended toward nuclear families.
If one were simply to accept the decline in old-age support as fact,
then it fits neatly into the relative-cost concept and into the delay and
ultimate arrival of the fertility transition. The old-age support can be
incorporated into the relative-cost measure, data permitting, as a supply
of work from the children, one that comes in the parents' old age, after
the children have become adults. In the early phase of development,
when this support looms large in the perception of benefits from an
extra child, its economic value is in fact raised by two trends. Declining51 Child Costs and Economic Development
mortality raises the probability that anyone child will live long enough
to deliver the kind of support one expects on the assumption that one
will live a long time. Meanwhile the secular rise in real wages raises the
purchasing power that any surviving child can command as a parent-
supporting adult, raising the economic value of any given work on the
parent's behalf. These trends contribute to maintaining higher fertility
in the early stages. At the same time, income growth makes the share of
parents needing and expecting such support decline with each genera-
tion. By the later phases of growth this old-age-support effect has given
away to a taste effect: the rising standards the succeeding generations
of couples have for support of each child also involve increasing con-
sciousness of the need to leave a nonhuman wealth legacy as well as the
need for development of human skills in growing children. This effect
helps feed the ultimate fertility decline, buttressed of course by the ulti-
mate rise of social security programs.
Before adding a layer of theory to an argument enjoying moderate
empirical support, however, it must be noted that the importance of this
argument is hard to quantify. And when one looks closer at problems
of quantifying on the importance of old-age support, one finds reason
to wonder whether this argument for peasants' having more children is
as traditional among peasants as among scholars studying them.
The direct evidence need not convince. It is cheap for interview re-
spondents to say they feel old-age support from children is one of the
advantages of having children. (Saying so may even have its own advan-
tages if the children are present at the interview.) The responses about
old-age support may also express the anticipation of future companion-
ship as much as future economic support. The international regression
evidence is also vulnerable to the suspicion that social security pro-
grams are correlated with the fertility-reducing influences owing to such
omitted variables as socialism, the position of women, housing scarcity,
and so forth.
When one looks more closely at the evidence on coresidence, one
discovers a host of reasons for wondering whether the actual old-age
support was ever great enough to decline greatly, reasons that inevitably
color one's impressions about perceived support as well. The fact that
grown-up children and their parents live together tells us little about
the economic flows between the generations. It can even be argued that
in the majority of cases the elderly parents were more than paying their
way by retaining ownership of the property. In Tokugawa Japan, for ex-
ample, the elderly widower or husband living with his children, adopted
children, and servants ruled as a patriarch over a complex household
in which he implicitly exchanged the rental of his property for labor
services.51 In America in the eighteenth century and early nineteenth52 Peter H. Lindert
century, a bare majority of decedents died with some noticeable amount
of personal and real estate, indirectly raising again the question of how
great a share of them were not recipients of aid from their children.
These clues about the extent of actual old-age support serve to raise
anew the question of how widely the old-age benefits of children are
perceived. Young couples in the process of family formation may well
heavily discount the putative old-age benefits, through ordinary psycho-
logical myopia, through a realization that the extra child may not sur-
vive them, and through a reasonable fear that extra births may drag
down the ability of anyone surviving child to give resources to his
parents much later on. The old-age support hypothesis is in need of
further testing. Yet it remains an unrefuted consensus view, one that is
easily incorporated into the concept of relative child cost.
1.7 Shifting Prices
Any overview of the influence of economic development on relative
child costs must supply information on how relative input prices have
drifted as well as on how the weights in the child-input and alternative
bundles have shifted. The clearest drift in relative prices relevant to
relative child costs has been the rise in real wage rates, or the cost of
an hour of human time in terms of all commodities. Even common un-
skilled labor has enjoyed a doubling and redoubling in its purchasing
power, and average wage rates have risen even faster with the rise of
average skills.
A natural subject of interest in relating wage movements to changes
in fertility is whether the wage rates facing adult females have risen
faster than those facing children during the course of economic growth.
If they have, then the relative cost measure might use this information
to quantify the extent to which this drift in wage structure has raised the
costliness of children. The average-wage ratio of adult women to chil-
dren has indeed probably risen, though apparently only through the
obvious mechanism of the upward drift in adult skills. There are abun-
dant isolated estimates of the ratio of adult female unskilled wage rates
to the wage rates for generally unskilled children, both for agriculture
and in industry. It is hard to find a trend in these estimates for unskilled
wage rates, since they refer to children of different ages in different
settings. And as long as the adult females and the children in question
are really both unskilled, it is doubtful that there could be any sustained
movement in the pay ratio of such close substitutes. It is safer to return
to the obvious: the average skill levels of adult females have drifted up
relative to those of teenagers, meaning that the wage rates attached to
the time costs of an extra child have risen relative to those on the time
contributed by the extra child.52S3 Child Costs and Economic Development
While the likely upward drift in the ratio of adult female to child
wage rates clearly implies rising relative child cost with economic devel-
opment, the clearer rise in all real wage rates has a different impact on
child costs in the early and late phases of development. In the early
phases, children are time supplying on balance, as in the survey data for
the rural Philippines. In this context, the general rise of real wage rates
reduces the relative cost of a child by magnifying his net time contribu-
tion relative to his net commodity cost. Yet at the later phases, as in the
United States postwar data, children have become time-intensive and
are made more costly by any further rises in real wage rates. We return
to this implication in the next section, when pnrsuing the evidence on
just when the shift from time-supplying to time-intensive children occurs.
Another relative price movement that would affect the relative cost
measure would be a change in the price of food relative to luxuries.
Since an extra child is invariably food-intensive and luxury-replacing,
a rise in the relative price of food would raise child costs. Theory would
tend to predict such a drift toward more costly food, as long as it pre-
sumes that the more rapid growth in productivity in the supply of lux-
uries than of food, rather than the demand-side tug-of-war between
Engel effects of income growth and the food-favoring demand effects
of population growth, dominates the terms of trade between food and
luxuries.
The usual available wholesale and retail price indexes show no clear
long-run trend in the ratio of food prices to luxury prices, at least in the
United States and Japan. The ratio of food price indexes to various "all
other" categories has had little net change since the early nineteenth
century, despite a historical peak about 1910-14 and some wide fluctua-
tions since. In urban Japan the relative price of food showed no prewar
trend, rose moderately across the wartime era, and changed little across
the 1950s and 1960s.53 Taken at face value, the standard price indexes
would imply that the food intensity of children has happened to be
irrelevant to the course of fertility decline in the past.
The usual indexes are likely to be biased, however, in the direction
of underestimating the relative decline in the price of luxuries. Luxuries
other than the consumption of traditional personal services are generally
"new goods" and goods experiencing considerable quality improvement
over time. The usual price series fail to capture the effect of the arrival
of newly available goods and of quality improvements. To follow the
prices of a fixed bundle of goods over many years, the usual Laspeyres
indexes must overlook those goods not existing in early years and those
whose quality is changing. Thus indexes of the price of transportation
will continue well into the age of the bicycle and automobile before
adding these modes to the bundle. Indexes of housing costs will go to
some lengths to follow rents on a fixed set of deteriorating dwellings;54 Peter H. Lindert
new units are added to the bundle in due course, but their initial avail-
ability and higher quality are not allowed to pull down the overall rate
of inflation. At the same time, urbanization, improved communications,
and the rise of mail-order shopping greatly cut the seldom-measured
information costs on most income-elastic goods. The noneconomist's
hunch that exposure to new "goods aspirations" makes children seem
costly would have a direct counterpart in a true measure of relative
child cost if the data were available. In all likelihood, a decline in the
cost of luxuries relative to staples, correctly measured, set in with the
earliest stages of economic development and has proceeded ever since.
Another price ratio of possible relevance to fertility is the price of
land relative to commodities and to labor. Little is known about the
long-run trends in land scarcity, despite the natural Malthusian intuition
that rising population densities should be accompanied by a rise in the
price of land. Within urban areas, data from the United States and Japan
show an unmistakable and almost monotonic rise in the price of land
relative to the price of commodities. In postwar Japan, urban site values
(not adjusted for capital investments in real estate) have skyrocketed
at real rates of increase of about 17% per annum.!">4 And since urban
site values are far above rural ones, urbanization has shifted large shares
of national populations toward locations charging a higher relative price
for lot space and room area. Both of these trends, urbanization and the
rise in urban site values, have contributed to an unmeasured upward
drift in the relative cost of an extra child, since extra children are living-
space-intensive, as one would expect and as noted above, even though
they reduce their parents' total expenditures on shelter.
An issue deserving further investigation is the relationship of the rela-
tive price of rural land to the course of fertility in rural areas. Studies
of United States rural fertility in the nineteenth century by Yasuba,
Easterlin, Leet, and others have shown generally good raw and partial
correlations between various measures of land availability and human
fertility.55 The measures of land availability have sometimes been land
prices and sometimes been demographically derived measures of popu-
lation density or "population pressure." If these neat empirical patterns
have actually identified an underlying mechanism linking greater land
scarcity to fertility decline, this is a very important result. It means that
ri~ing population pressure on the land tends to check itself by cutting
rural fertility. Whether one believes in the hypothesis affects one's view
of the future of population growth in currently developing countries.
Easterlin's interpretation of the land-scarcity correlation is that it
indeed identifies a basic mechanism underlying rural decision-making
about family size. The pattern is viewed as a reflection of the basic
desire of prospective parents to be able to set their children up with
assets like those they themselves possess, so that greater "population55 Child Costs and Economic Development
pressure" puts pressure on them either to postpone marriage or to limit
fertility within marriage. They have, in other words, an inheritance
motive somehow tied to the availability of land, a motive presumed to
outweigh the importance of children as potential old-age support.
It is not clear whether the empirical results warrant an interpretation
couched in terms of land inheritance, or whether land scarcity would
always have the effect of rural fertility ascribed to it in these studies.
Land availability may simply have been a convenient proxy for the ratio
of current to prior living standards in United States cross sections in the
twentieth century. This interpretation is consistent with fertility's seem-
ing to have been highest not in the initial settlement of raw frontier but
in the next-least-settled areas. Gains in income prospects over prior in-
comes would have been highest not in the initial clearing of soil but soon
thereafter when the high yields of the new lands were secured. If this is
the real meaning of the nineteenth-century United States rural patterns,
then they represent a rediscovery of the "relative-income" hypothesis
and would not imply declining rural fertility as population fills up the
land in developing countries unless income growth were decelerating.
The land-inheritance interpretation is essentially a relative-cost rather
than a relative-income hypothesis. It argues that an extra child is viewed
as land intensive, in the sense that a couple would tend to demand more
acres of land if it had an extra child than if it did not. This has not been
demonstrated. Nor could a simple correlation between farm size and
family size confirm the land intensity, since the earnings of extra chil-
dren may make it possible to work or buy more land.
If land defined in acres rather than value did not prove an important
share of rural child-input bundles, then one could quantify the contribu-
tion of rising land values to relative child costs. One question to be
answered first is, Relative to what is land said to be scarce in a way
relevant to fertility? The tentative answer seems to be: relative to lux-
uries, which children replace, and to common labor, of which children
are net suppliers in less developed rural settings. It is possible that land
scarcity, thus incorporated into a relative-child-cost measure, has been
an important preventer of births. This is possible because land has in-
deed been most scarce relative to luxuries, though not always relative
to child labor,56 in the rural areas with highest fertility. So says the
United States rural cross section for the mid-nineteenth century. So also
say the upward drifts in the price of land relative to luxuries, but not
labor, in the United States between 1800 and World War I and in Japan
since the 1880s. If the land-intensity of an extra child can be demon-
strated sufficiently to reject suspicions to the contrary, then the relative-
cost index will prove to be an analytical link between rising land scarcity
and declining fertility. The empirical tasks have not been completed,
however.56 Peter H. Lindert
1.8 The Shift toward Time-Intensity
Given the rise in real wage rates with development, and the slight
evidence that extra children shift from being time-supplying to being
time intensive, it is important to add further documentation of this
apparent shift. If it really occurred, it is important to get a better idea
of when it occurred, in order to judge roughly when the upward drift
of real wage rates might have stopped lowering and started raising the
relative cost of an extra child.
One way of bringing additional evidence to bear on the issue of time-
intensity is to settle for less direct evidence on the net time costs like
those graphed in figures 1.2 and 1.4 above. Time-use studies probing
the interior of households will be rare. We can find more abundant data,
however, on net earnings effects, as proxies for true net time cost effects.
It is likely that the evolution of the total time children contribute to
their parents' households will parallel that of their earnings in the mar-
ketplace. And the net effect of an extra child on parents' paid work is,
conveniently, more relevant to the issue of time intensity than the missing
data on parents' total time inputs into the child.
It should be possible to gather several household surveys from devel-
oping countries giving breakdowns of household income among house-
hold members, allowing regressions to determine the contributions of
children and their effect on the working hours of their parents. Their
effect on parents' rates of pay can also be quantified if one can solve
the issue of simultaneity between number of children present and par-
ents' rates of pay.
Until surveys with income breakdowns by household member are
analyzed, the only additional sources for currently developing countries
are those simply reporting total household income and the ages and
numbers of children present, plus variables other than income or family
composition. Such data sets will show, for almost any less-developed
country, that extra children, especially extra older children, are associ-
ated with higher total household income. One example of this kind of
indirect evidence is a set of regressions run using survey data from In-
dian village surveys: Naurangdeshar, Rajasthan, 1968-69, and Ankodia,
Gujarat, 1967-68.~7The regressions, which could be repeated using any
of several developing-country surveys, ran total income against the male
head's age, his age squared, his literacy (Ankodia) or years of schooling
(Naurangdeshar), the age and age squared of any adult male relatives
present, value of land, tractor ownership, the value of other assets-and
the number of children in each of several age-sex groups. The terms
relating to children look at a glance like age profiles of net annual in-
come contributions, rising with the child's age and significantly positive
for males 16-25. The magnitudes also related to average household
income and adult male earnings in proportions near the shares of the net57 Child Costs and Economic Development
earnings effects shown for the Philippines in figure 1.4. While children
thus appear time supplying and income increasing again in these Indian
villages, this form of evidence remains vulnerable to the obvious charge
of simultaneity. One could argue that the same results show that higher-
income parents of given age and other attributes felt they could have
more children and had them earlier.58
The more satisfactory kind of evidence, which at least breaks down
household income by household member, can be gleaned from the ear-
lier history of Europe and the United States. One such data source is
the unusual survey taken of agricultural workers' families in England
between 1787 and 1796 by the Reverend David Davies and Sir Fred-
erick Morton Eden, just as the French Revolution, bad harvests (1795-
96), food price inflation, and Malthus's first essay on population were
beginning to work their effects on the English countryside.5n Parish
vicars and rectors were asked to find half a dozen or so families of
agricultural laborers who were poor yet generally working enough to
avoid extreme dependence on the parish. The purpose was to estimate
family consumption, saving or dissaving, and sources of income. The
sample was apparently defined by the income range of the male head
(except for the observations on widows' families), which varied less
than total family income. Considerable effort was devoted to accounting
for all income despite the difficulties of estimating home production and
to allocating this income to individual family members as far as prac-
ticable. The survey also yielded parish- and date-specific data on food
and rent prices in most cases, allowing deflation of earnings by the price
of a loaf of wheat bread or, in some cases, its price equivalent in wheat
flour or oatmeal.60
Table 1.8 shows some apparent earnings effects of an extra child in
an English agricultural laborer's family in the late eighteenth century.
The figures are subject to several cautions. The effects of children on
husbands' work and earnings could not be estimated, given the nature
of the sample. Some of the children's earnings were reported only for
the group of children, and in some cases only the ages of the oldest and
youngest children were given, requiring some age interpolation based
on the number of middle children.G1 And, despite the efforts of the inter-
viewers, it is likely that some of the children's and wives' earnings were
attributed to the husband, owing to the widespread practice of group
home production (e.g., "husband earns 1s. 6d. a week weaving with
spinning help by eldest daughter").
It appears from table 1.8 that a surviving third-born child would have
been earnings supplying, though perhaps less so than the extra Filipino
child hypothesized in figure 1.4 above. A third live birth might also have
been a net supplier of earnings, though infant and child mortality was
severe enough in that setting to make the net earnings effect of the extra
birth hinge critically on one's choice of a discount rate. If one accepts58 Peter H. Lindert
Table 1.8 Children's Earnings and the Effect of Children on Wives'




Earnings, % of Adult Number
Age Loaves/Year Male Earnings of Children
8 11.6 3.2 38
9 12.7 3.5 34
10 26.9 7.3 33
11 32.9 8.9 35
12 41.4 11.2 28
13 71.4 19.4 21
14 54.8 14.9 20
15 67.1 18.2 13
16-18 84.4 22.8 14
19-22 72.9 19.8 6
B. Wives' Earnings, by Number ofChildren and Ageof Youngest
Number of Children
Age of Youngest Child lor 2 3 4 5 or More
0-1, or"infant" loaves 33.8 39.3 32.6 31.5
% of adult male 9.2 10.7 8.9 8.6
number ofobservations 12 21 20 35
2-5 loaves 56.7 42.0 41.4 45.9
% of adult male 15.4 11.4 11.2 12.5
number of observations 12 4 13 22
6 or older loaves 44.8 42.9 27.8 29.1
% of adult male 12.2 11.7 7.6 7.9
number of observations 13 3 3 1




















Note: loaves/year= half-peck loaves of wheat bread (7.3 to 8.3 lbs) per year;
adult male earnings = 368.1 loaves/year.59 Child Costs and Economic Development
the further assumption that an extra child contributed more value in
chore help (not counted as earnings in the survey) than he demanded
from the (housebound) mother, then the time-supplying nature of a
child in rural eighteenth-century England seems reinforced.
For later dates in England and America we have only scraps of infor-
mation on the earnings effects of an extra farm or rural child. Reviewing
the evidence for twentieth-century America elsewhere, I have found that
an extra farm child was still a net supplier of earnings in the 1920s and
not an earnings reducer or time intensive until about the 1960s.62 The
available shreds of information thus imply that rural children remained
time supplying and earnings supplying throughout most of the course of
economic development. If further investigation supports this tentative
view, it appears that rural child costs are reduced by the upward drift
in farm wage rates over most of economic development. This throws
the burden of explaining the observed decline in rural fertility back onto
other variables: taste-formation mechanisms, the cheapening of new lux-
ury goods, possibly land scarcity, and so forth.
Within the rural sector, it would be worth while to pursue the issue of
which economic activities most enhance the net time supply of a child,
thereby possibly retarding fertility decline when real wage rates are ris-
ing. One obvious suspicion is that abundant opportunities for cottage
industry and farm household by-employments, as flourished in Britain
in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and in Tokugawa and
and Meiji Japan, raised the net time contribution of a child by raising
his productive employment by more than his interference with the time
use of adults.
The choice of crop may also have been a historically important influ-
ence on the economic benefits of children. So far, the one fairly clear
pattern linking crop to reliance on child labor is that cotton agriculture
is perhaps the major crop with the highest share of its labor performed
by children, as well as being very intensive in the use of all labor per
acre. The child-labor intensity of cotton has been noted by several
observers of Egyptian agriculture since at least the 1940s.63 The link
between children and cotton has also been stressed in a study of the
cotton areas of Texas in the 1920s.64 It may be that forces stimulating
a shift to cotton cultivation may buoy up children's earning power and
even increase fertility for entire rural regions.
Outside of agriculture the transition from earnings-supplying children
to earnings-reducing children came earlier, but still not until the late
phases of economic development. Elsewhere I have presented data for
United States industrial families' earnings patterns, tentatively conclud-
ing that the switch to earnings-reducing children, and presumably time-
intensive children if all flows were measured, did not come until World
War I or later.65 Further regression results reported by Michael Haines60 Peter H. Lindert
now appear to confirm that, as of the large United States government
survey of industrial workers' families in 1889-90, children were still net
earnings suppliers to their parents' households in a subsample from five
West European countries as well as in the United States.66 Only after
the upward drift of adult skills and wartime demands for female labor
had pulled much larger numbers of wives away from home did an extra
child come to take more earnings and, presumably, total time from his
parents than he supplied.
Within the industrial sector, there appears to be a pattern relating
natural-fiber textiles to heavier net earnings effects for an extra child,
whether in factories or in cottages. This is what observers thought about
cotton mills and woolen mills in nineteenth-century Massachusetts and
Lancashire, and about silk-spinning in rural homes in Meiji Japan. It is
a pattern now seemingly confirmed by regressions run on the 1889-90
industrial workers' sample. These regressions find much heavier average
earnings by children in cotton and woolen textile families than in the
glass, ferrous metal, and mining industries, after allowing for the ages
of children and wives, husband's relative income, and regional vari-
ables.67 While the textile industries also made heavier use of adult fe-
male labor, their effect on the earnings lost by a mother owing to an
extra child was smaller than their effect on child earnings. If this pattern
is confirmed by studies on contemporary developing countries, it appears
that specialization in textiles, like cotton agriculture, may be a force
holding fertility up as wage rates advance in some textile-oriented econ-
omies.
Although the shift to earnings-reducing and time-intensive children
remains somewhat uncertain, there is little doubt that it has occurred.
Figure 1.5 brings this out by summarizing the earnings effects of an
extra child in the home in four survey samples widely spread over time
and space. In the postwar urban United States a firstborn child is clearly
earnings-reducing, as already shown in figure 1.2 above. Yet in the other
three settings, corresponding to earlier stages of development, extra chil-
dren are earnings-supplying. As the dates in figure 1.5 also imply, the
shift has come late in the development process. Just how late is an




A careful and straightforward definition of the relative cost of an
extra child holds considerable potential for organizing otherwise vague
arguments about how changes in the economic environment should affect61 Child Costs and Economic Development
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Fig. 1.5 Estimated effects of an extra child in the home on family
members' earnings. Selected survey results. (a) net effect
of the child on earnings of parents (- = loss; on mother's
earnings only in England and New York); (b) child's own
earnings. Vertical axes measure these effects as a percentage
of average earnings of the adult males in the sample (in thc
United States, 1960, as a percentage of an adult male's
annual earnings of $4,000).
Poor rural English couple's third-born, 1787-96; see table 1.8 and accom-
panying text. New York industrial worker's firstborn, 1889-90: see FSA,
table 4-5 and app. B. The percentages are (a) ages 0-1: - 2.0%, ages 2-5:
0%, ages 6-13: -1.1%, ages 14-17: 1.6%; and (b) ages 10-13: 2.3%,
ages 14-15: 28.7%; ages 16-17: 32.5%. Rural Filipino couple, no specific
parity, 1975: see fig. 1.4 and accompanying text. Urban United States couple's
firstborn, 1960 census: FSA, tables 4-5 and E-l. The percentages are: (a)
pregnancy: -4.7%, under 1: -16.5%, age 1: -13.6%, age 2: -13.2%.
age 3: -12.6%, age 4: -10.9%, age 5: -5.1%, age 6: -3.1%, age 7:
-2.6%, age 8: -2.3%, age 9: -2.0%, age 10: -1.8%, age II: -1.5%,
age 12: -1.3%, ages 13-17: -0.1%; (b) age 14: 1.0%, age 15: 2.5%.
age 16: 5.4%, age 17: 8.3%.62 Peter H. Lindert
fertility incentives. The relative cost concept also seems capable of con-
tributing to our understanding of why fertility failed to decline in the
early stages of so many countries' development, and it also partly ex-
plains the ultimate secular fertility decline.
Matching the relative cost concept with historical information on
price and wage trends and on shifts in the net effects of a child on family
allocations of home time and commodities suggests forces that steadily
reduce fertility incentives throughout development and also forces whose
incentive effect has reversed itself. From the earliest stages of modern
economic development, likely declines in the prices of luxury goods
relative to staples should have made children seem more costly, other
things equal. Yet the implications of improvements in real wages and
child survival rates would have had an opposite effect in the early stages
of development. With children still time-supplying as defined here, early
increases in real wage rates for common labor would have made chil-
dren seem cheaper relative to the home activities with which they com-
pete. It may have been, for example, that wage gains undercut the case
for holding down family size in England's industrial revolution, as the
dismal scientists advancing the iron law of wages feared. By contrast,
in the later stages of development children have become time-intensive,
especially outside of agriculture, translating further improvements in real
wage rates into increasing awareness of the costs of a child in terms of
the mother's career. As far as we can judge from crude comparisons
of time-use studies across classes and nations, this shift to time-intensity
has not been due to any marked rise in the gross time inputs into a child
of given birth order and spacing. Rather, it has been due to the decline
in child time contributions to parents' households and to the drift toward
less time-intensive, more commodity-intensive alternatives to an extra
child.
The relevant-cost concept is thus able to string together reasons for
predicting an early lag in fertility decline as well as the later decline.
There is thus at least preliminary support for not rejecting the third of
three interpretations of the early persistence of high fertility offered
above. This interpretation argues that succeeding generations of young
couples may have exercised crude fertility controls all along and simply
found no net new incentives to reduce births in the early stages of eco-
nomic development. This interpretation remains a competitor with the
view that couples never thought in terms of child costs and benefits until
a development threshold was passed, and with the view that early devel-
opment finally gave them the social and physical ability to have as many
children as they wanted.
The evidence presented here is extremely fragmentary and falls far
short of establishing that arguments about relative child costs, as defined
here, unlock the many mysteries in fertility patterns over time and across63 Child Costs and Economic Development
groups. It does indicate, however, the kind of evidence waiting to be
pursued in the study of fertility in developing countries.
1.9.2 Child-Cost Proxies and the Identification Problem
The usefulness of the concept of relative child cost will depend on
the availability of appropriate empirical proxies that allow one to isolate
its influence on fertility without going through the tedious process of
actually calculating the various time and commodity costs of children
and alternatives to them. This paper has advanced several suggestions
for choosing proxies, suggestions that can translate into choices of spe-
cial interaction terms for fertility regressions.
At the "micro" level of samples consisting of individual households,
the relative-cost concept is not likely to bring great changes in our
choices or interpretations of independent variables. The relative-cost
measure combines information about couples' economic environment
that is not likely to be observable at the individual household level, ex-
cept as a transformation on place of residence and some of the couple's
attributes, such as schooling. Using, for example, the wage rate of the
wife as a measure of the relative price of time inputs, or schooling as a
proxy for lower-cost access to information about luxury goods and
services, will accomplish little, since wage rates and schooling have al-
ready been surrounded by a host of competing interpretations in work
on fertility.
The inability of the relative cost concept to untie Gordian knots at
the "micro" level reflects not so much the limitations of the concept as
the limitations of microtesting. Many of the questions bearing most
directly on population policy are questions of how changes in the aggre-
gate economic environment will affect aggregate fertility. The organizing
issue of this paper, for example, was how economic development might
affect aggregate fertility by changing the market signals facing whole
groups. Similar in its aggregation and its reference to time-series analy-
sis is the issue of the overall effectiveness of deliberate policies toward
fertility. Micro cross sections often fail to yield answers to such ques-
tions by not letting the independent variables of interest vary and be
measured.
For more aggregate testing on changes in fertility over time, where
the units of observations are socioeconomic groups, regions, or nations,
the relative cost can be proxied, though perhaps only part by part. Since
group wage rate data are more often available than group data on prices
for commodities, a logical starting place for proxying relative cost pat-
terns is with interaction terms multiplying the earnings intensity of an
extra child by the change in a real wage rate for the group or region or
nation. For this purpose it would be desirable to proxy the earnings in-
tensity by a gap between the change in the labor force participation of64 Peter H. Lindert
wives caused by the presence of, say, a child under 6 and the participa-
tion rate for teenagers. Yet the participation rates for wives are seldom
available by presence-of-children categories. One is likely to be forced
further down the shopping list of suitable proxies. If it happens that
there is evidence that only the real wage rate changes, and not the
earnings intensity of an extra child, vary across groups, then the wage
rate change alone proxies the change in relative cost. If not, one must
look for further suitable participation-rate proxies, such as the rate for
single young adult females (again versus that for teenagers). In a setting
in which the earnings intensity of an extra child is suspected of varying,
yet the only participation rates for women are overall age-group aver-
ages, the hunt for a time-cost proxy would have to be abandoned, since
the overall female participation rate is simultaneously bound up with the
dependent variable, fertility. In many cases, though, proxies can be had
and may improve fertility forecasting.
Notes
1. A convenient overview of our eclectic consensus on how development cuts
fertility is United Nations (1973, 1:88-106). Theorizing about the evolution of
child costs and benefits with the development process goes back at least as far as
Harvey Leibenstein's (1957) remarks on this theme. Stigler's lemma was enunci-
ated by George Stigler (1969, p. 266) and helpfully cited (but not observed) by
Donald N. McCloskey (1976, p. 434).
2. The Brownlee estimates in table 1.1 and figure 1.1 imply that the death rate
in England and Wales fell dramatically from 1731-70 to 1780-1820. The dating
of the decline in the death rate and age-standardized mortality rates remains the
subject of debate, however, with some scholars putting the turning point as late as
the 1810s and arguing that the birthrate may also have been higher in the late
eighteenth century and early nineteenth century than is shown here.
3. On Tokugawa fertility rates, see Hanley and Yamamura (1977). Revised
estimates of Meiji vital rates under varying assumptions about reporting biases are
given in Morita (1963).
4. Habakkuk and Postan (1965, vol. 6, part I, table 9); and Kuznets (I966,
table 2.3).
5. A similar point was made by Kuznets (I975, p. 391). The present statements
do not mean, of course, that literacy and urban residence did not reduce fertility
among literate and urban households.
6. Deane and Cole (1969, chaps. 1, 2, 9).
7. Gilboy (1934); Bowley (1900); and Flinn (1974).
8. On national product per capita, see Bank of Japan (1966, parts I and 10).
On real agricultural wages, see Ohkawa, Shinohara, and Umemura (1966-72,
8:135,9:220). On industrial wage rates, see Minami (1973, pp. 306-8). Product
per capita grew at 2% per annum or a bit less, depending on whose estimates one
accepts in the controversy over rice production figures. The real wage rate for
male day-hired agricultural workers grew at the following rates: 1886-88 to 1900-65 Child Costs and Economic Development
1903: 2.84% per year; 1900-1903 to 1910-13: 0.54% per year; 1910-13 to 1924-
27: 1.96% per year. Female wage rates in agriculture grew slightly faster. The
real daily wage rates in manufacturing generally grew at the following rates calcu-
lated for female textile workers: 1900-1903 to 1910-13: 1.22% a year; 1910-13
to 1924-27: 3.60% per year.
9. Maddison (1971, app. A and B), reworking the production estimates of Blyn
and Sivasubramonian.
10. Richards (1975, chaps. 3-5); O'Brien (1968).
11. Oechsli and Kirk (1975, p. 410). See also Kirk (1971); and Beaver (1975,
chaps. 6-8). It should be noted that the fertility lag under discussion here is evi-
dent in the data reviewed by Oechsli and Kirk, even though their article advanced
the view that the fertility transition is really more predictable and prompt among
today's developing countries than others have suggested. Their deemphasis on the
lag is made possible by the simple expedient of constructing "development in-
dexes" standardized so that an index of zero is not achieved until the country has
already experienced considerable increases in ten development indicators.
12. Tabbarah (1971, 1976); and Easterlin (1975).
13. Tabbarah's 1976 version of the model actually posits a rise in fertility as
well as in completed surviving family size before the threshold is reached. This
rise in fertility is hard to observe empiricallY, leaving it little support over the null
hypothesis of no early change in fertility. Yet his model is easily altered to posit
no change in maximum attainable births, a rise in child survival chances, and a
decline in desired number of children.
14. For extensive citations to the estimates of absolute child costs and benefits,
see chapter 4 of Lindert (1978), hereafter cited as FSA.
15. The role of the child-cost concept within a model of optimal fertility regu-
lation with uncertain birth outcomes is shown more formally in FSA, chap. 3.
16. I assume that the parents expect to live until after their surviving children
have left the home as adults.
17. If the family member in question does not in fact work for pay, then the
shadow price of his time may of course differ from the market wage for working
persons with his attributes. Yet, as shown elsewhere (FSA, chap. 4, n. 4), the
choice of time price matters to the measurement of relative child costs only where
it applies to family members whose paid work is in fact affected by the child's
existence. This being the case, the relevant margins of time use here will be ones
for which wage rates (plus possible effects of time allocation on future earning
power) are the appropriate time prices.
18. Estimates of the positive effect of children on the working hours of postwar
United States husbands are reviewed in FSA, appendix B. An estimate for the rural
Philippines in 1975 is given in section 1.5 below.
It has not yet proved possible to quantify an effect of children on their fathers'
pay rates per unit of time from cross-sectional data, because simultaneity in the
relationship between husband's income and the number of children threatens to
distort any measure of so subtle an effect. Panel data may help isolate this effect.
Or an effect of children on a husband's wage rate could be quantified synthetically
if one were to take the estimates of the effects on hours and then separately esti-
mate the effects of hours upon the husband's rate of pay, ignoring any other effect
from fatherhood to rate of pay.
19. A budget constraint of this type has been developed, for example, in Becker
and Lewis (1973).
20. The term "quality" is more suggestive of child attributes, or of child "out-
puts" in the household-production-function framework, than of inputs into the66 Peter H. Lindert
child. Even at that level, it invites unhelpful controversy by labeling as human
"quality" such narrower observable attributes as schooling achievement and in-
come potential.
21. See, for example, Caldwell (1968, chap. 6); Mainichi Newspapers (1972,
chap. 1); and especially Fawcett et al. (1974).
22. Fawcett et al. (1974, appendix, especially tables AI, A2).
23. FSA, chap. 4, sec. 4.
24. FSA, app. E.
25. The calculations underlying tables 1.2 through 1.5 are laid out in FSA, app.
A-E.
26. Houthakker (1957); and FSA, app. D.
27. Data on house purchases in New Haven, Connecticut, between 1967 and
1970 show that larger family size significantly raises the consumption of lot size
and room space while lowering the consumption of location and other housing
quality. See Goodman (1976, table 4.8); and King (1975, table 5.1). Several other
studies have confirmed that more children lead to the consumption of more rooms
despite the reduction in shelter expenditures, among them David (1962).
28. On patterns in child-care time in the United States and other countries, see
the sources cited in FSA, chap. 4 and app. C, plus Walker and Woods (1976);
Szalai (1972); Dodge (1966, pp. 91-99); Kingsbury and Fairchild (1935, chap.
13 and appendix); and the studies of rural Philippines, Java, and Nepal cited
below.
29. Note that the estimated effects of a child on the mother's earnings are an
average over many households. In some cases the appearance of, say, a firstborn
child causes wives to drop out of the labor force and actually raises the amount
of time they devote to nonchild home activities. In other cases the arrival of the
firstborn merely takes some time of an already unpaid mother away from other
home activities. It is the averaging of such cases that yields a time cost exceeding
the effect of the child on parents' paid work.
30. FSA, chap. 5.
31. Conrad and Meyer (1958).
32. Evans (1962, pp. 208-14). It should be noted that Evans's estimates of
slave life expectancy in 1850, which are the ones used by Fogel and Engerman
(1974), are higher than any others given in Evans's secondary sources or in the
life-table estimates of Eblen and Meeker.
33. Conrad and Meyer (1958); Evans (1962, pp. 214-21); Butlin (1971); and
Fogel and Engerman (1974, vol. 1, chap. 3, and vol. 2, pp. 62-87).
34. The predicted values for slaves in the New Orleans slave market are those
based on sales in the 1850s reported in Kotlikoff (1976, table 3; regression for the
1850s based on 775 group and individual sales). A 20-year-old was valued at
$823.25, and 76.535% of newborns were estimated to survive to their 20th birth
day in 1850.
35. The most promising historical data base on time use within rural house-
holds, outside the United States farm household surveys of time use from the
1920s on, is several of the zemstvo household surveys taken in prerevolutionary
Russia. Those taken in Vologda and Volokolamsk, for example, seem to have
separate time-use data on men, women, boys, and girls, to judge from their cita-
tion by Chayanov (1966, pp. 179-82). A guide to the contents of dozens of un-
tapped zemstvo surveys is given in Svavitskii (1961, especially appendixes).
36. For a fuller description of the Laguna sample, see Boulier (1976); and
Popkin (1976). I am grateful to Drs. Boulier and Popkin for making their tenta-
tive results available to me and for running several supplementary regressions.67 Child Costs and Economic Development
In the calculations underlying figure 1.4, I have valued the time of family mem-
bers at their income per hour worked at any productive task: P1.595 for husbands,
PO.938 for wives, and P1.31 for working children. For adults, these averages,
which partly reflect lower-paid home work, are below the market wage rates for
jobs away from home: P1.89 for working fathers and P1.94 for working mothers.
37. The regressions run thus far have not been able to identify the (presumably
higher) time costs of a "firstborn"; that is, of the only child present in the home
at the time of survey.
38. The regressions run thus far do not reveal any clear net difference between
the amount of time spent on the care of an extra preschool child by all persons
between the Laguna survey and the time-use survey in Syracuse, New York, in
1967-68. Slight differences in methods of data collection and in model specifica-
tion make such comparisons hazardous in any case.
39. Figure 1.4 implies that the child leaves home on his or her 20th birthday.
It is difficult to know the modal or mean ages of home-leaving in the contempo-
rary rural Philippines. The age of 20 was chosen because the Laguna sample hap-
pened to show very little dropoff in the numbers of children present by age until
age 20. The choice of a hypothetical home-leaving age does not seem to matter
greatly to the discussion of the net benefits derived from a child by his parents as
long as children are more or less earning what they themselves consume in their
teens and across their early twenties.
40. An extra child in a household already having children makes the father
work an extra 3.16 hours a week in its first year, an extra 2.24 for ages 1-6,0.12
hours less (i.e., no real effect) for ages 7-9, an extra 2.05 hours a week for ages
10-12, 0.17 hours less for ages 13-15, and an extra 5.23 hours a week for ages
16-19 (Boulier [1976, table IIC]). MUltiplied by 52 weeks, thus ignoring seasonal
effects, one gets a stronger effect than the 8-50 hours of extra work a year esti-
mated for the father of a later-born child in various United States studies (FSA,
app. B).
41. Preliminary unreported regressions showed no net effect of extra children
on the hourly rate of pay for working mothers. This may be the result of (0)
model misspecification, (b) a genuine lack of such an effect, and/or (c) the fact
that the hourly rates of pay for different tasks were imputed rates at which out-
siders would have to be hired to perform those tasks, rather than personal market
wage rates facing the mothers.
42. The Lorimer scales, based on 1950 expenditure data from India, and given
in Lorimer (1967) and cited in Mueller (1976, table II-I). On these scales, the
average household composition in Laguna had 4.242 adult-equivalent consumption
units. Assuming that consumption was 90% of reported income in the Laguna
households would make each Lorimer "unit" cost P1221. This peso value was then
applied to the age-and-sex -specific scales to estimate commodity inputs into the
extra child.
43. Mueller (1976).
44. The data for the Javanese village, near Jogjakarta, were gathered and are
currently being analyzed by Benjamin White, in his doctoral dissertation at Colum-
bia. Those from Nepal were gathered by Robert Creighton Peet. I am indebted to
Moni Nag for reporting the results used here in his paper cited in table 1.7.
45. In the Javanese village, all adults devoted only 2.0 hours a day to child
care, or less than a quarter of the adult male work input average. These two hours
of household child care time were spread across more than one child, but the
number of children under 6 years is not reported.68 Peter H. Lindert
46. Whether an extra child is a net economic asset to his parents in less devel-
oped economies may be as unclear to the parents as it is to scholars. Interviews
with 1,497 males and 1,499 females in the partially urbanized Western and Lagos
states in Nigeria in 1973 showed both sexes evenly divided in their responses to
questions about the net asset issue:
Measure Response Males Females
Whether another child would make the Richer 32% 32%
parents richer or poorer The same 44% 44%
Whether children who have reached Poorer 25% 25%
adulthood have returned more wealth Yes, more 46% 30%
than that spent on them (parents with The same 16% 27%
such children only) No, less 38% 43%
(Okediji et al. [1976, p. 127]). This suggests at least some conformity between what
the cross-sectional estimates so far imply and what couples perceive, since it is
hard to imagine contemporary United States couples' responding so neutrally about
the net economic effects of an extra child.
47. Fawcett et aI., The Value of Children . .. Comparative Perspectives (1974,
table A5).
48. Mainichi Newspapers (1972, chap. I).
49. Hohm (1975).
50. On the decline of intergenerational coresidence in the United States, see
Stern, Smith, and Doolittle (1975); Beresford and Rivlin (1966); Taeuber and
Taeuber (1971, table VI-7); and Edward Pryor's estimates from Rhode Island
census data in Laslett (1972). On the intermediate patterns in industrial Lanca-
shire in the mid-nineteenth century, see Anderson (1971, pp. 139-40).
On the more extensive coresidence in developing Asian countries, see Nag
(1976); Kessinger (1974); and the chapters on Serbia and early Japan in Laslett
(1972).
51. Smith (1959).
52. Another structural change raising the relative time cost of an extra child is
the trend toward greater geographic separation of young couples from their rela-
tives, a change that raises the transactions costs of purchasing child-care time in a
way not revealed by the available wage series.
53. Adams (1944, pp. 33-34); U.S. Bureau of the Census (1976, vol. I, chap.
E); and Ohkawa et al. (1966, vol. 8).
54. Lindert (1974); Ohkawa et al. (1966, vol. 9); Bank of Japan (1966); Mills
and Ohta (1976, p. 700).
55. Yasuba (1962); Easterlin (1971, 1976); Leet (1976).
56. Note that the empirical relevance of child wage rates to relative child costs
is to be judged, in rural settings where children are net labor suppliers, by patterns
in the purchasing power of labor time in terms of the inputs in which rural chil-
dren are intensive-food (and possibly land). The contribution of wage-rate differ-
ences to fertility differences must thus begin by comparing wage rates with the
prices of food. In the United States cross sections for the mid-nineteenth century,
it is inappropriate to examine nominal wage rates across regions, as Easterlin has
done (Easterlin [1976, pp. 61-62]). Wage rates without board must be compared
with the cost of food, which was indeed lower in the frontier areas, leaving a posi-
tive correlation between the real value of a child's net labor supply and fertility.
57. The data are described and analyzed in Chernichovsky (1975, pp. 69 ff.).
I am grateful to Dr. Chernichovsky for running additional unreported regressions
on these data at my request.69 Child Costs and Economic Development
58. In his paper for the present conference, Allen C. Kelley has reduced the
simultaneity problem by applying two-stage least-squares regression techniques to
survey data from urban Kenya in 1968-69. His structural equations show positive
and sometimes significant effects of extra children of unspecified age on total fam-
ily income (tables 2, 3, A-I, and A-2). This result at least resembles the result
obtained by ordinary least squares from the two rural Indian villages, though dif-
ferences in models and data bases obviously complicate the comparison.
59. Davies (1795); Eden (1797).
60. In a minority of cases it was necessary to use a bread or flour price for the
same year from elsewhere in the same county or an adjoining county. The bread-
flour-oatmeal price ratios were based on parishes reporting more than one of these
prices.
61. My interpolations of the ages of middle-born children and allocations of
children's earnings among the older children may have affected the age profile of
children's earnings in unknown ways, but they would not affect the undiscounted
average earnings at all.
62. FSA, chap. 4.
63. Richards (1975, citing 1943-44 data); Ghomeny (1953, table 26, citing al-
ternative 1943-44 data); and Hansen (1969, p. 503, referring to the early 1960s).
64. "Children are the backbone of the labor supply ... and in a large measure
determine the extent of the cotton crop.... [About 45% of all workers are chil-
dren, and] the median age of all child workers was only 11 years, 5 months" (Gib-
bons and Armentrout 1925, p. 30).
One source failing to confirm the child-labor intensity of cotton relative to other
crops was the University of Nanking's massive farm survey of 1929-33. It failed
to record a higher share of labor performed by children in the one locality (out
of about 160) that specialized in cotton, or a higher share in several localities
having a larger-than-average minority share of their area planted in cotton Buck
(1937, chaps. 6, 8). This is not a very satisfactory test, since cotton was not heav-
ily represented in the sample. More generally, however, the Buck Statistics volume
remains an underutilized resource for studying the division of labor by cro'p and a
host of other issues relating to peasant farm productivity and land tenure.




Professor Lindert's paper is valuable in many ways. One cannot help
admiring his ability to draw on data from many countries and many
historical periods. The choice-theoretic framework he employs is an
immense aid to logical thinking, even jf one is critical of its narrow focus
on economic variables. Lindert's major conclusion-that at early stages
Eva Mueller is professor of economics and research associate at the Population
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of development the value of children may rise because they may earn
more income-is important and, I believe, correct.
Relative cost, the concept central to Lindert's paper, is merely a
weighted price index. An advantage of this concept is that changes in
weights can be ignored as long as there is reason to believe the weights
change to the same extent in the numerator and the denominator. For
example, I find myself in agreement with Lindert's assumption that the
shares of "other goods" in the bundle of child inputs and the bundle of
alternative inputs probably move in more or less parallel fashion. Thus,
for rough comparisons, changes in quantities of goods inputs need not
be measured. Relative changes in time inputs are much more prob-
lematic, as we shall see.
Rather than confining myself to relative cost, I will remark on changes
in absolute costs of children in the course of development. Absolute cost
is a much more comprehensive concept than relative cost. Rather than
focusing exclusively on prices, it also focuses on quantities of time and
other resources that must be sacrificed to raise a child (net of the time
and resources derived from the child). Absolute cost is affected by the
quality of child the couple chooses or feels it must have. It is a concept
that helps us consider "taste" factors, such as the attractiveness of goods
that are alternatives to children. Most important, absolute cost has im-
portant policy implications. If the net absolute cost of a marginal child
up to the time of adulthood exceeds his contribution to household in-
come, economic development is likely to be retarded by large family
size, since the household's ability to accumulate physical and human
capital is reduced. The noneconomic satisfactions of raising children may
of course override absolute child costs, as far as the household is con-
cerned; but parents may not be aware of the macroeffects of a society-
wide preference for large family size on the economy and hence on their
own family's chances of attaining a higher standard of living. In many
less-developed countries governments are in a quandary when they must
decide whether to pursue an energetic family planning program or adopt
a politically expedient "do-nothing" stance on the family planning issue.
As economists we have a serious responsibility to produce research that
aids correct policy decisions. For this, absolute cost measurements are
more useful than relative cost measurements.
Lindert himself seems intrigued with the question whether children
are ever an economic asset, and he goes beyond the relative-cost frame-
work to present some pertinent calculations. My own work (Mueller
1976) has made me skeptical of the proposition that children are an
economic asset, and I emphatically share his desire for more data that
might throw light on this problem. The question that needs to be an-
swered is not whether children are ever an economic asset but, under71 Child Costs and Economic Development
what conditions are children an economic asset and under what condi-
tions are they an economic liability?
Let us consider changes in child costs during the course of develop-
ment, without being constrained by the narrow focus of the relative-cost
concept. We may think of two kinds of communities: type I is a stag-
nant, traditional community where there is little technological change,
little accumulation of physical and human capital, and little unused land
of acceptable quality. In this stagnant community the marginal produc-
tivity of capital and labor is very low (as T. W. Schultz argued years
ago). Tastes are static. Type II is a community that is modernizing its
agriculture or industries or both; the demand for labor and capital is
growing; incomes are growing; a taste is developing for new kinds of
goods and children of higher quality. Communities in less developed
countries range on a continuum from type I to type II. Usually, within
the same country, there are type I and type II localities as well as sub-
groups of the population.
Starting with labor, in a type I community wages and the marginal
productivity of labor are low. An additional child reduces per capita
income, thereby increasing the marginal utility of income. In conse-
quence, the family is forced to engage in additional work that has very
low productivity and that, in the absence of the child, would not be con-
sidered worth undertaking. There is increasing evidence of a positive
correlation between part-time work by women and higher fertility among
poor households (Smith 1976). Husbands may also work longer hours
as family size grows, and children may share in the work. In this sense
an additional child is time releasing; but it imposes a burden of addi-
tional work on the family that is an opportunity cost, since in the ab-
sence of the child the family would have preferred to work less.
As we move toward a type II community, the demand for labor and
the productivity of labor rise. Thus there is an income effect on labor
force participation and a price effect. The strength of the income effect
depends on the culture and on the kinds of employment opportunities
generated by development. In some LDCs, but not in others, work by
women or children, especially manual work, is considered demeaning
and a sign of low status. As income rises, therefore, women may work
less. Urbanization and industrialization tend to reduce work opportuni-
ties for women, especially work that is compatible with child-rearing
(Boserup 1970). When women do not want to work for a combination
of reasons relating to social status and the characteristics of available
jobs, market wages greatly exaggerate the cost of child-care time. If
education is highly valued, increasing income may lower children's par-
ticipation in the labor force. However schooling does not seem to inter-
fere seriously with work by children until it is extended beyond ages72 Peter H. Lindert
10-12. Thus the result of development may be that the mother has more
time for child care, or the children work less, or both. To be sure, there
are other type II communities where work by warnen and children does
not have negative status implications. In that case the incentive effect of
higher wages on labor force participation may outweigh the income
effect. Children and women will then be more willing to engage in mar-
ket work and children may be time releasing until a later stage of eco-
nomic development.
In all, the transition from a type I to a type II community may have
four combinations of consequences for labor force participation and
hence for the cost of children:
I
Mothers tend to work less ~ lowers child costs
1 Children tend to work more -----..~lowers child costs
I
Mothers tend to work less ~ lowers child costs
2 Children tend to work less • raises child costs
I
Mothers tend to work more ~ raises child costs
3 Children tend to work more ~ lowers child costs
I
Mothers tend to work more ~ raises child costs
4 Children tend to work less ~ raises child costs
In case 1 children become less costly, and fertility may be stimulated by
development. Perhaps Egypt and some Latin American countries re-
semble case 1. Case 2 may be more common than case 1; here the effects
of changes in labor force participation on child costs are mixed. Taiwan
during the 1960s is an example. Case 3 also is mixed. In case 4 children
become more costly and fertility is discouraged on that account. Con-
temporary Western communities are typical of case 4. The point is that
the transition from type I to type II communities may be accompanied
by diverse changes in work patterns. In consequence, the effect of devel-
opment on child costs via work patterns and wages is not uniform for
all countries. In the long run all type II communities may move toward
case 4; how long this will take depends on cultural attitudes toward
women's work, educational aspirations for children, and the kinds of
jobs economic development opens up for women and children.
Turning now to the rate of return on capital, as a less developed
community moves from type I to type II, it benefits from new methods
of production and other innovations. Hence the demand for capital is
increased. In a type I community a farmer may have little need for
additional capital, and resources in old age may be as valuable to him
as resources now. In a type II community the farmer may profit greatly
if he has money to buy hybrid seeds, fertilizer, a water pump, and so
forth; a small businessman may profit similarly if he can buy an electric
motor. Thus children start to compete with capital accumulation. The
discount rate rises and, since child costs are concentrated in the early73 Child Costs and Economic Development
years and returns from children follow later, the cost of children rises
relative to the "alternative H bundle." While the relative-cost framework
in principle allows for a discount rate, it has the shortcoming that child
costs are compared explicitly only with the bundle of alternative H
services. The other possible trade-off-between the marginal child and
a higher rate of capital accumulation-is neglected. High discount rates
may not fully reflect the difficulty a farmer or artisan has in obtaining
capital. Capital markets are imperfect in LDCs, and for the lower in-
come groups access to capital is sometimes as much of a problem as
exorbitant interest rates. Thus, while children may work more and at
higher wages as development proceeds and therefore become cheaper,
the opportunity cost of the funds required for their early upbringing is
bound to rise.
Finally, changes in tastes need to be brought into the picture. In a
type I community, a very limited assortment of H enjoyments is avail-
able. As the amount of traditional H services acquired increases, there
may be diminishing marginal utility. Another child may be much more
gratifying than an increase in the alternative H bundle. When new con-
sumer goods become available and education for children is desired, the
attractiveness of the trade-off is altered. To be sure, this is a taste rather
than a price effect. Nevertheless, in the eyes of parents the marginal
child becomes more costly because the things that must be sacrificed for
it are more highly valued in type II communities.
In sum, in the course of development the growing demand for capital
and new consumption aspirations make children more costly, while ris-
ing wages and increasing employment opportunities may raise or lower
child costs. The total effect of development on child costs depends on
such factors as social attitudes toward work by women and children, the
kind of jobs the particular economy creates for women and children,
the characteristics of the capital market, and the availability of new con-
sumer goods. Further, it depends on the extent to which type II condi-
tions have penetrated the economy. In Mexico, for example, in spite of
a relatively high per capita income, the poorer segments of the popula-
tion still live under close to type I conditions.
Returning briefly to Lindert's method, a major advantage of the rela-
tive-cost concept is that it lends itself to comparisons that range widely
over time and space. This is interesting; but it seems that studies that
compare distant times and widely differing geographic areas and cultures
do not deserve high priority in future research. Research to date sug-
gests that the kind of economic variables that enter our models have
only limited power to explain fertility change. Noneconomic factors and
structural characteristics of the economy play a large role and interact
with economic variables. Hence we need very intensive microlevel stud-
ies that explore how economic factors help explain differences in fertility74 Peter H. Lindert
decisions between households that share the same culture, and where
the remaining differences in the social and economic environment can
be explicitly taken into account in the analysis.
In addition, studies of perceived costs deserve some attention. I agree
with Lindert that actual movements in absolute and relative child costs
are major determinants of changes in perceived costs. However, mea-
sures of perceived cost would not give us exactly the same information
as measures of actual costs. First, there is bound to be a time lag be-
tween changes in actual and perceived costs; and changes in some costs
may be perceived more quickly than changes in some other costs. Since
time lags are the most puzzling, as well as the most crucial, aspect of
the demographic transition, any data that throw light on time lags are
of interest. Second, as Lindert suggests, studies of perceived costs may
help us learn which parts of the actual costs and benefits of children are
salient to couples and which ones they tend to overlook. Third, per-
ceived costs and benefits are affected by a couple's time horizon and
time preference-matters we can only guess about when we work with
traditional economic data. Last, while perceptions of costs and benefits
reflect to some extent economic and demographic factors that can be
measured directly, they also reflect a variety of environmental influences
that often cannot be brought into the analysis in a more direct way.
Thus it appears that much might be learned from studies of perceived
costs and benefits, especially if data on actual and perceived costs could
be collected for the same population.
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